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Abstract
Chapter 1 provides a dynamic model in which the CEO can manipulate their performance
measure at the expense of firm value. The model features learning about the CEO’s skill,
dismissal and short-termism. While the standard principal agent model focus on the conflict
of interest between the principal and the agent regarding the agent’s effort level, I focus
on the agent’s effort allocation between short-term and long-term. There are two potential
inefficiencies that could be caused by the conflict of interest between the CEO and the firm.
First, agent putting more focus on short-term performance can deteriorate the firms future
profitability. In addition, boosting short-term performance without being noticed by the
firm can affect the firm’s belief about the CEO’s skill. This could prevent firms from making
optimal firing decisions. I find that inefficiency caused from firms not able to update the skill
of the CEO is marginal and most of the inefficiency comes from CEO sacrificing long-term
profitability for the sake of short-term performance.
Chapter 2 shows that the slope parameter of the linear quantile regression measures a
weighted average of the local slopes of the conditional quantile function. Extending this result,
we also show that the slope parameter measures a weighted average of the partial effects for
a general structural function. Our results support the use of linear quantile regressions for
causal inference in the presence of nonlinearity and multivariate unobserved heterogeneity.
The same conclusion applies to linear regressions.
ii
Chapter 3 shows that the slope of the linear quantile regression minimizes the weighted
mean squared error loss function of the specification error when the variable of interest is
endogenous. Extending this result we also show that the slope of the linear quantile regression
measures a weighted average of the derivative of the true quantile regression.
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Most modern corporations are hierarchical, with the result that its most important employee,
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), has an major influence on the firm’s success. At the
same time, since the CEO can appoint the firm’s board of directors and is able to control the
information that the board receives, the CEO can attenuate supervision from the board. A
conscientious board can seek to mitigate these well-known effects by a variety of measures
that seek to evaluate the CEO objectively. Since corporations are primarily profit-seeking en-
terprises, one of the easiest and most relevant measures of CEO performance and competence
is firm profitability. However, there are many methods of inflating short-term profits and
strict performance standards may have the unintended consequence of inducing a CEO to
engage in short-term behavior that enhances immediate profit at the expense of the long-term
profitability that serves the interests of the firm’s owners. Ideally, the board is able to perfectly
observe the CEO’s actions to correctly evaluate the CEO. However, when this ideal is not
met, the board’s evaluation about the CEO can be easily distorted by the CEO’s short-term
behavior that enhances immediate profits. This paper examines the amount of shareholder
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value at stake from the CEO’s behavior.
The removal of poorly performing CEO is essential to maximize firms performance. The
firm should fire the CEO whenever it is profitable to do so. However the threat of being
replaced may induce the CEO to engage in short-term behavior that enhances immediate
profit at the expense of the long-term profitability. This could prevent the board from making
the optimal replacement decisions. This paper provides a dynamic model in which the CEOs
can manipulate their performance measures at the expense of firm value. In the model, the
board decides at each period whether to fire or keep the current CEO. CEOs have different
skill levels, meaning that some CEOs are more skilled than others. The CEO with a higher
skill can generate higher average profitability. The board cannot directly observe CEO’s
skill, but instead learns about it over time by observing a noisy signal of the skill, profits.
Each period the board observes the signal and updates its belief about the CEO’s skill and
replaces the current CEO with a new CEO with unknown ability whenever it is optimal to
do so. However, the CEO can manipulate this signal by engaging in a short-term action.
Short-term action enhances the current period’s profit at the expense of long-term profitability.
Short-term action involves actions such as cutting R&D and reducing employee training.
Also, it could be interpreted as spending resources on earning management. By enhancing
the current period’s profit, the CEO is able to make the board believe that his skill is higher
than it actually is. When the CEO is in danger of being replaced, the incentive to engage in
short-term action to increase the chance of surviving this period increases even if it means it
would deter the firm value. Complicating matters, the board cannot observe the amount of
short-term action taken by the CEO. Hence, the short-term action not only deters firm value
but also makes it more difficult for the board to correctly update the belief about the CEO’s
skill. Thus the board cannot make an optimal firing decision. Conflict of interest between the
board and the CEO arises since the board only cares about the value of the firm, but the CEO
2
cares both about his job security and the value of the firm. This implies that the firm and the
CEO having conflicting goals which potentially leads to inefficiency. The goal of this paper
is to analyze the CEO’s behavior and how the conflict of interest between the board and the
CEO affect the value of the firm.
This model can be interpreted as a dynamic principal agent model with learning. The
standard principal agent model often assumes that the principal knows the correct distribution
of future output and focus on the optimal contract that induces the agent to take the desired
level of effort by the principal. However, in this case the agent can mislead the principal
about the future by choosing the action that the principal does not expect. Demarzo and
Sannikov (2016) analyze a dynamic principal agent model which analyzes the case where the
principal and the agent both learns about the fundamentals of the firm. Their model focus
on the conflicting goals between principal and the agent regarding the agent’s effort level.
The agent can distort principals beliefs about the fundamentals of the firm by not exerting
the effort level that the principal desires. They take into account the consequences of this
information rent and characterize the dynamics of the agent’s compensation, firm payout
and liquidation/termination policies. Instead of focusing on the conflict of interest between
principal and the agent regarding the agent’s effort level, I focus on the conflict of interest
regarding the allocation of the agent’s effort between short-term and long-term. Since a very
high work ethic is required to become a CEO in the first place, it is natural to think that their
cost of effort is very low. If the cost of effort of the agent is negligible then there will not be
a major conflict of interest regarding the level of effort. However, there could be a conflict
between the CEO and the firm regarding how the CEO should allocate his effort. The CEO
may allocate more effort on projects that has immediate reward since that would increase the
short-term performance of the firm which could result in an increase in job security.
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In section 1.2, I present a model that captures these features and in section 1.3, I show a
numerical simulation of the model. Model predicts that the lower skilled CEO is more likely
to focus on short-term performance compared to the higher skilled CEO. This is intuitive
since the lower skilled CEO is more in danger of getting fired compared to the higher skilled
CEO. As a result, the lower skilled CEO focus more on the short-term performance in order to
keep his job instead of focusing on increasing the long-term value of the firm. Higher skilled
CEO can focus more on increasing the long-term value of the firm since his job is more secure.
Also, the model predicts that the CEO is more likely to focus on the short-term when they are
at risk of losing their job. This is intuitive since if the CEO job is secure, he can focus more
on increasing the value of the firm which increases the share values that the CEO owns. In
addition, I find that inefficiency caused from firms not able to update the skill of the CEO is
marginal and most of the inefficiency comes from CEO sacrificing long-term profitability for
the sake of short-term performance.
1.1.1 Relation to the Existing Literature
Although it is difficult to prove that such CEO behavior exists, there are researches done to
provide some evidence of managerial short-termism. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005)
conducted a survey and interviewed 400 executives. 80 percent of the survey participants
reported that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and main-
tenance to meet an earnings target. Also 55 percent of the participants reported that would
delay starting a new project to meet an earnings target, even if such a delay entailed a small
sacrifice in value.
Edmans,Fang and Lewellen (2015) study the quantity of equity scheduled to vest in a
given year. They find that vesting equity is significantly negatively correlated with cuts in
R&D, advertising, and capital expenditure, and positively correlated with the likelihood of
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meeting or narrowly beating earnings targets.
There could be many reasons for the CEO to focus on the short-term performance at
the expense of long-term firm value. For example, CEO may focus more on short-term
performance to enhance short-term stock prices(see Stein (1989), Bebchuk and Stole (1993)) or
to enhance their reputations in the CEO labor market(see Campbell and Marino (1994).) In this
paper, the threat of getting replaced induces the CEO to focus on the short-term performance.
Dismissal can lead to loss of current employment, reduced future career options(see Brickley
et al. (1999)), loss of unvested equity-based compensation (see Dahiya and Yermack (2008),
Laux (2012)) and so on. It is natural to expect CEOs to do everything to avoid getting fired.
The model presented in this paper features moral hazard problem with learning. While the
standard principal agent model often assumes that the principal correctly knows the correct
distribution of future output, I consider a model where the agent can mislead the principal
about the future output by choosing the action that the principal does not expect. Demarzo
and Sannikov (2016) analyze a model where the principal and the agent both learns about the
fundamentals of the firm. While their model focus on the conflicting goals between principal
and the agent regarding the agent’s effort level, I focus on the conflict of interest regarding
the allocation of the agent’s effort between short-term and long-term instead. Taylor (2010)
uses a similar model that features learning about CEO ability and costly turnover to estimate
the cost of firing that would rationalize observed turnover rates. However, his model does
not include any hidden action by the CEO.
1.2 The Model
In this section I study a dynamic model where the CEO can boost the firm’s short-term
performance at the expense of long-term value of the firm. The model features firm which
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lives infinitely, the CEO, and the board. In the model, each CEO has different skill levels
θ. Some CEOs are more skilled than others, meaning they can generate higher average
profitability. The board cannot directly observe CEOs skill, but learns gradually by observing
a noisy signal, which is the profitability. The board infers the CEO’s skill by observing the
profitability and makes an optimal firing decision. However, the CEO can engage in a short-
term action at to boost the current profitability. This short-term action is only known by the
CEO and not observed by the board. Profit πt is given as follows
πt = ht + Ca · a
ht = φ · ht−1 + θ − at + ηt
Profit πt consists of two components ht and Ca · a. ht denotes the quality of the firm at time
t and Ca · at is the profit generated by the CEOs short-term action at ∈ [0, A], A > 0. If the
CEO does not engage in short-term action i.e. at = 0, the quality of the firm would be the
same as the observed profit πt. Notice that the short-term action would increase the current
profit by (Ca − 1) ∗ at but decreases the quality of the firm by at. Short-term action can be
interpreted as an action that has negative effect on the long-term value of the firm but results
in immediate increase in current profit. These actions may involve cutting R&D and reducing
employee training. Also, short-term action at could be interpreted as allocating resources to
earnings manipulation instead of allocating effort to projects that actually increase firm value.
Parameter φ reflects the persistence in firm quality ht with 0 < φ < 1. This persistence allows
the short-term action to have a long-term consequence. The shock ηt is independently and
normally distributed with mean zero and variance ση . θ denotes the skill of the CEO which is
constant over time. The skill of the CEO θ is a private information and only known to the
CEO himself. The board represents the interests of shareholders and is replacing the CEO if
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necessary. Each period the board makes a firing decision dt ∈ 0, 1 to maximize the firm value.
Whenever the firm fires a CEO, they incur a firing cost C f and replace him with a new CEO.
The cost of firing includes executive search costs , severance packages, adjustment costs and





βs · πt+s − dt+s · C f ] (1.2.1)
β is the discount factor with 0 < β < 1 . Now I make an additional assumption on the
parameter Ca.
Assumption 1. (i)1 < Ca <
1
1− β · φ for all a ∈ R+
Since engaging in short-term action moves the current profit by (Ca − 1) · at, assumption
1 ensures that positive short-term action at > 0 will increase current period’s profit. Also
short-term action decreases the health of the firm by at which decreases the firm’s value
by
at
1− β · φ . Assumption 1 ensures that
at
1− β · φ > Ca · at which implies that any positive
short-term action at > 0 is harmful for the firm value. Therefore at = 0 will be the optimal for
the firms value.
The board can observe all parameters, but cannot observe CEO’s skill levels and CEO’s
action. Therefore, when the board observes high profit,it cannot tell whether this is due to
CEO skill, luck or the short-term action. When the board hires a new CEO, the prior belief of
the CEO’s skill is given as
θ ∼ N (µ0, σ20 )
Each period the board updates its belief about skill θ based on the information contained in
πt.
The CEO plans to work at a firm for a finite time period, t ∈ 0, 1, ..., T where T denotes the
retirement date. I assume that the retirement date T is known by both the CEO and the board.
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βs · (dt+s − α · φT−s+t · at+s)] (1.2.2)
dt ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the CEO is working or not. dt = 1 if the CEO is working and
dt = 0 if the CEO is not.
The objective of the CEO consists of 2 components. First component is the expected
duration that the CEO can stay on the job. The second component is the disutility that the
CEO incur from the short-term action. This objective function can be interpreted as follows.
The CEO acquire benefits from working as a CEO, hence the CEO gains utility from keeping
his job every period. Also, I assume that the CEO owns some shares of the firm. Engaging in
short-term action harms the long-term profitability of the firm, hence decreases the value of
the shares that the CEO earns. Therefore, the CEO incur some disutility from engaging in
short-term action. For simplification, I assume that the CEO cares about the firm’s value at
time T. This could be interpreted as he is granted a stock option that vests after he retires.
However, engaging in short-term action could increase the probability of keeping the job.
Hence, there is a some trade-off between job security and the value of the shares. This utility
function of the CEO implies that the CEO is only focused on two things. First is the expected
discounted duration that he can stay at the job. Since the CEO does not only receive high
wages and bonuses but is also granted a special treatment and privileges. It is natural for the
CEO to maximize the duration that he can stay on the job. The CEO is also worried about the
value of the firm since he owns some equity which is tied to the firm’s value. By assuming the
CEO’s utility function this way, I am treating the compensation package that the CEO receives
is determined exogenously. While in the standard principal agent model, principal can chose
a contract to offer to the agent to mitigate moral hazard, I assume that compensation package
is decided from the exogenous factor such as competition from other firms to sign the CEO.
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This assumption allows me to simplify the situation and focus on how the board’s termination
policy affects CEO’s behavior and the value of the firm.
For simplicity I also make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. If there exist s > 0 such that ds = 0 then dt = 0 for all t > s.
Assumption 2 implies that once the CEO loses his job, he retires and never works again.
At first glance this assumption might seem too extreme. However, it is natural to think that
getting fired from the job leads to a massive decline in reputation. As a result it will be
extremely difficult for the fired CEO to find a new job that gives a similar level of utility to
the previous job. Hence, Assumption 2 implies that once the CEO is fired, he can only find a
job that is much worse than his previous that he would rather retire.
1.2.1 The Board’s problem
For simplicity, I assume a naive board that believes the CEO always takes the action that
maximizes the firm value i.e. at = 0. This assumption means that the short-term action
taken by the CEO is not just unobserved but also unexpected to the board. Although this
assumption may seem a little extreme at first, there are plenty of real life examples where the
board completely failed to detect CEO’s myopic behavior. Under this assumption, the board
believes that the profit process is given as
πt = φ · πt−1 + θ + ηt
Based on the πt the board updates its belief about the CEOs’ skill θ according to Bayes’
rule. Since prior beliefs and signals are normally distributed, the boards’ posterior beliefs
about CEOs’ skill will also be normally distributed. At the end of period t, distribution of the
9
board beliefs are denoted as
θ ∼ N (µt, σ2t )










which goes to zero in the limit when t becomes infinite. The posterior mean follows
µt+1 = µt +
σ2t
σ2η
· (πt+1 − φ · πt − µt) (1.2.4)
The posterior mean can be written as the sum of the mean belief of the previous period and
the current periods unexpected profit.
Objective of the board is to maximize the firm value defined in equation(1.2.1) At the
beginning of each period the firm decides to keep or fire the CEO. The proposition below
provides the Bellman equation for the board’s optimization problem. Let τt denote the number
of years the current CEO worked for the firm at the end of time t.
Proposition 1. The firm value at the beginning of period t + 1, Mt+1 can be written as
Mt+1 =
φ
1− β · φ · πt + V(µt, τt) (1.2.5)
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where the value function V solves the Bellman equation
V(µ, τ) = max{Vf , Vk}




1− β · φ µ + β · E[V(µ +
σ2(τ)
σ2η
· ε(τ), τ + 1)] if 0 ≤ τ ≤ T − 1
V(µ0, 0) if τ = T
ε(τ) ∼ N (0, σ2η + σ2(τ))
The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix. Extensive part of the proof follows
Taylor(2010). Proposition 1 implies that there exists a threshold µ∗(τ) such that the board
fires the CEO as soon as its belief of the CEO’s skill i.e. the posterior mean of θ, µt, drops
below a threshold µ∗(τ). This threshold depends on all the parameters and the number of
years the current CEO has worked for the firm. For example, rasing the cost of firing will
reduce the threshold, making firing less likely.
1.2.1.1 CEO’s problem
Each period CEO chooses at ∈ [0, A] to maximize the objective function give in equation (2.5)
knowing the firing policy of the board. Let µ∗(τt) denote the firing threshold at time t and





· (µ∗(τt)− µt−1)− (θ + Ca · at − at − φ · Ca · at−1)
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· (µ∗(τt)− µt−1)− (θ + Ca · at − at − φ · Ca · at−1)
)
where Fη is the cdf of η. Note that the probability of getting fired pt increases in σt−1, at−1
and decreases in θ, at. This is intuitive since a higher variance σt−1 implies that the signal
will have a higher impact towards the mean belief about the CEOs skill, which means that
the bad luck will decrease µt heavily. Also the probability of getting fired would increase in
at−1. Since the board assumes that at−1 = 0, profit function that the board expects at period
t is φ · πt−1 + θ + ηt. However, the actual profit function is φ · πt−1 + θ + ηt − phi · Ca · at−1
which is phi · Ca · at−1 lower than the board expects. Therefore it is harder for the CEO to
meet the expectation of the board.













µt+1 = µt +
σ2t
σ2η









V(θ, µt−1, at−1) = maxat{1− α · φT−t · at + (1− pt) · Et[V(θ, µt, at)]}
V(θ, µT , aT) = 0
This is solved by backwards induction. As mentioned previously, the CEO faces a tradeoff of
job security and firm value. Engaging in short-term action would decrease the value of the
shares that the CEO owns but increases the job security this period.
This is the source of the conflict of interest between the board and the CEO. While the
board only cares about the value of the firm, the CEO cares both about his job security and
the value of the firm. This implies that the firm and the CEO having conflicting goals which
potentially leads to inefficiency.
The board wants to replace the CEO with low skill to maximize firm value which is given
by (1.2.1). Since the skill of the CEO is not observed by the board, the board has to infer about
the CEO’s skill from the realized profits. However, the threat of being replaced may induce
the CEO to focus more on the short-term performance and sacrifice long-term profitability
to manipulate the board’s belief about the CEO’s skill. Since the board does not observe the
CEO’s action at and updates the CEO’s skill based on the assumption that at = 0, the CEO
may have an incentive to engage in short-term action to boost the short-term profit in order
to make the board believe that he is high skilled. For example, when the board’s beliefs about
the CEO’s skill is close to the firing threshold, the CEO may engage in short-term action just
to survive this period. There are two inefficiencies that could be caused by the short-term
action. First, agent putting more focus on short-term performance can deteriorate the firm’s
future profitability. When the CEO engages in short-term action at > 0 to increase his job
security, the firm’s value will decrease by ( 11−β·φ − Ca) · at. From Assumption 1, any positive
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short-term action will decrease firm’s value. In addition, boosting short-term performance
without being noticed by the firm can affect the board’s beliefs about the CEO’s skill. This
could prevent firms from making optimal firing decisions. Recall that the board cannot
observe CEO’s skill and the board uses Baye’s rule to updates its beliefs about the CEO skill
using the realized profits assuming that the CEO does not engage in short-term action. Since
the board makes a firing decision based on these beliefs to maximize firm value given by
(1.2.1), not able to update the CEO’s skill properly can have an effect on firm value. In the
next section, in order to understand how the conflict of interest between the board and the
CEO affects firm value, I solve the model numerically.
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1.3 Simulation
In this section I solve the model numerically and discuss the model prediction about firing
policy, frequency of CEO turnover, the CEO action and the inefficiency caused from the
CEO’s action. To solve the board’s problem, I first derive the board’s beliefs about CEO
skill by using Bayes’s rule. Then I substitute this into the board’s objective function (1.2.1)
and numerically compute the Bellman equation(1.2.5). Next I substitute the firing threshold
obtained from numerically solving the board’s problem to the CEO’s objective function
(1.2.2) . I numerically solve(1.2.5) by backward induction to obtain the optimal CEO action.
Throughout the simulation I use the parameter values β = 0.99, µ0 = 1, σ0 = 1, T = 60. Also,
I regard 1 period as 1 quarter. Hence, the yearly discounted factor would be 0.994 ≈ 0.96.
Also, T = 60, which implies that CEO retires after 15 years in office.
The simulation goes as follows.
1. The new CEO is hired and his skill θ is drawn from N(0, 1)
2. The CEO decides the action at.
3. ηt is drawn from N(0, ση) and the profit πt is realized.
4. Given πt the board updates its beliefs based on (1.2.3) and (1.2.4).
5. If the posterior mean is above the firing threshold the board keeps the CEO and returns
to (2)




In this section I illustrate the board’s firing policy. The board updates the CEO’s skill every
period by observing the profit πt every period. The board fires the CEO whenever the
posterior mean drops below the threshold derived from the optimal firing policy. This
threshold depends on the model parameters and the CEO tenure.
Figure 1.1: Firing Threshold for each C f = 8, 10
Figure 1.1 plots the firing threshold versus CEO tenure for 2 values of firing cost C f = 8, 10
when the persistence parameter φ = 0.8. Notice that firing threshold increases with tenure.
This means that the board is more willing to fire CEO’s who have worked longer for the firm.
There is less uncertainty about the long tenured CEO. The board prefers higher uncertainty
about the CEO’s skill since they can minimize the downward risk by firing him. The option
to fire a CEO is more valuable when the uncertainty about the CEO’s skill is higher. Also the
firing threshold starts to decline towards the CEO’s retirement period 60. This is because the
board knows that the CEO is going to retire soon anyway. Hence the belief about the CEO’s
skill has to be lower to make the firing worth it for the board. Increasing the cost of firing will
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shift the threshold down and make firing less likely. If firing a CEO is more costly, the belief
about the CEO skill has to be lower to make the firing worth it for the board.
Figure 1.2: Firing Threshold for each φ = 0.8, 0.95
Figure 1.2 shows the firing threshold versus CEO tenure for 2 values of persistence
φ = 0.8, 0.95 when the firing cost is C f = 8. Increasing the persistence parameter φ will shift
the threshold up and make the firing more likely. This is because if the persistence parameter
is high, having a low skilled CEO is more punishing to the firm. From equation(1.2.1) the
CEO adds θ to the health of the firm every period. Since the health of the firm is persistent
adding θ to the health of the firm results in θ1−β·φ more firm value. Hence, CEO’s skill is
more important to firm value when the persistence parameter is high. Higher persistence
parameter φ leads to more firing since keeping the low skilled CEO will cause more harm to
the firm value.
1.3.2 CEO turnover
In order to understand the model better, I illustrate the model prediction on frequency and
the timing of firing when the CEO always take the optimal action for the firm i.e. at = 0 for
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all t. I will call this the benchmark case. In this case the board can correctly update the beliefs
about the CEO’s skill thus can make the optimal firing decision. I use the same parameters in
the previous section which are β = 0.99, µ0 = 1, σ0 = 1 .
Figure 1.3: CEO Survival rate when at = 0 for all t for each C f = 8, 10
Figure 1.3 plots the predicted CEO survival rate versus CEO tenure for two values of cost
of firing C f = 8, 10. Other parameters are β = 0.99, µ0 = 1, σ0 = 1 , ση = 3 φ = 0.8. As shown
in the previous section, increasing the cost of firing will shift the threshold down and make
firing less likely. 27 percent of the CEO will survive 60 periods and retire when C f = 10 while
only 24 percent can survive for 60 periods and retire when C f = 8. Also increase in the firing
cost affects the timing of the firing as well. Firing occurs later when the firing cost is higher.
Figure 1.4 plots the predicted CEO survival rate versus CEO tenure for two values of
persistence parameter φ = 0.8, 0.95. The other parameters are β = 0.99, µ0 = 1, σ0 = 1 ,
ση = 3 C f = 8. Since increasing the persistence parameter φ = 0.8, 0.95 will increase the firing
threshold, it makes the CEO firing more likely. 24 percent of the CEO will survive 60 periods
and retire when φ = 0.8 while only 14 percent can survive for 60 periods and retire when
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Figure 1.4: CEO Survival rate when at = 0 for all t for each φ = 0.8, 0.95
φ = 0.95.
Figure 1.5: Unconditional firing percentage of CEO when at = 0 for all t for each θ = 0, 1, 2
Figure 1.5 plots the unconditional firing percentage of CEO with 3 different values of skill
level θ = 0, 1, 2 at each tenure levels when at = 0 for all t. Obviously the lower skilled CEO is
more likely to get fired compared to the higher skilled CEO. Notice that most of the firing of
the CEO occurs in the early stages of their tenure. This is intuitive since the uncertainty about
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the CEO’s skill is high in the early stage of the CEO’s tenure. Hence one bad outcome will
have a high impact on the boards beliefs about the CEO’s skill which could lead to dismissal.
However if the CEO is highly skilled, the board is likely to learn that the CEO is highly skilled
over time, thus makes the firing at a later stage of the tenure unlikely.
This could be also seen from equation (1.2.3) and (1.2.4). As shown in equation (1.2.3) ,the
variance about the CEO’s skill decreases over time as the board learns about the CEO’s skill.
Equation (1.2.4) shows that as variance σt decreases, change in the mean beliefs about the skill
decreases as well.
There will still be some firing in the later stage of CEO tenure since firing threshold in-
creases in CEO tenure as shown in the previous section. Even though keeping their job for
long period of time usually implies that the board believes that the CEO is highly skilled,
the firing threshold also increases overtime which makes it tougher for the CEO to keep his job.
1.3.3 CEO’s Action
Now I analyze the model prediction when the CEO is allowed to engage in short-term action.
In this case CEO can distort the board’s belief by engaging in short-term action. In this section
I illustrate the model predictions about the CEO’s optimal actions when the parameters are
β = 0.99, µ0 = 1, σ0 = 1, φ = 0.8, C f = 8, ση = 3, Ca = 4. First I illustrate how the CEOs with
different skill level behave when ηt = 0 for all t. I consider this case to show how the CEOs
with different skill level for one specific path of ηt. Since ηt is drawn from N(0, ση), ηt = 0
could be considered as case where the CEO is neither lucky nor unlucky.
Figure 1.6 plots the actions taken by the CEO versus the CEO tenure for 5 values of skill
level θ when ηt = 0 for all t. For example the green dotted line shows the actions taken
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Figure 1.6: CEO actions when ηt = 0 for all t for θ = −1, 0, 1, 2, 2.5
by skill level θ = 1 CEO when the disturbance in the profits ηt = 0 for all t. The line ends
at period 30 meaning that the CEO is fired after 30 periods. Notice that lower skilled CEO
are more likely to engage in more short-term actions compared to the higher skilled CEO
on average. This is intuitive since the lower skilled CEO is more in danger of getting fired
compared to the higher skilled CEO. Hence it is natural for them to focus on surviving the
current period and worry less about the future survivability. On the other hand, higher skilled
CEO can focus more on the future survivability and the value of the shares that he owns. This
implies that hiring lower skilled CEO may be more costly to the firm than it should be since
the lower skilled CEO is more likely to engage in short-term action. Also notice that the CEO
plays more short-term action when they are close to getting fired. As the CEO’s job become
more insecure, the CEO tends to focus more on surviving the current period. For the higher
skilled CEO, most of the short-term actions are taken in the early stages of their tenure. This is
because they are at most vulnerable in the early stages of their tenure since uncertainty about
the CEO’s skill from the board’s perspective. Hence one bad outcome could swing the boards
beliefs about the CEO’s skill. Therefore even if the CEO is highly skilled it is natural to protect
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himself from getting accidently fired from bad luck. Once the board learns about the CEO’s
skill decently well, the outcome does not move the board’s belief to that extent. Hence the
short-term action will not change the probability of getting fired as much as it will in the early
stages of the CEO’s tenure. Interestingly, the CEO with θ = 2 engages in more short-term
action compared to the CEO with θ = 1 in the first period. This implies that if the CEO is
highly skilled, the optimal strategy for him is to engage heavily in short-term action in the
early periods to make sure that the board recognize him as a highly skilled CEO. Once that
is achieved, he can just focus on the long-term. This strategy may not work for the average
skilled CEO since he can only deceive the board for a short period of time and eventually the
board will find out that he is an average CEO. Next I illustrate the average actions taken by
the CEO among 10000 ηt paths.
Figure 1.7: Average actions taken by the CEO. The average is taken among 10000 {ηt}60t=1 paths
Figure 1.7 plots the average actions taken by the CEO from 10000 simulations versus the
CEO tenure for 5 values of skill level. Similar to the ηt = 0 for all t case, we can see that on
average, the CEO with lower skill tends to engage in more short-term action compared to
the CEO with higher skill. Also for the higher skilled CEO, most of the short-term actions
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are taken in the early stages of their tenure. Short-term actions starts to increase in the later
stages of the CEO’s tenure since the firing threshold increases with CEO tenure. As the firing
threshold increases over time, the CEO becomes more vulnerable to bad outcomes which
leads to increase in short-term actions to protect himself from getting fired.
Figure 1.8: CEO Survival rate of the Model case and the Benchmark case
Figure 1.8 plots the survival rate of the CEO versus tenure. Benchmark case which is
shown in a red line is the survival rate of the CEO when the short-term action is not allowed.
In this case the the board can correctly update the CEO’s skill. The blue line shows the
survival rate when the CEO can engage in short-term action. Since the CEO can manipulate
the boards belief to their advantage, they are able to survive longer.
Figure 1.9 plots the unconditional firing percentage of CEO with 3 different values of skill
level θ = 0, 1, 2 at each tenure levels when the CEO is allowed to engage in short-term action.
Compared to the bench mark case, there are less firing in the early stages since the CEO has
the option to manipulate the outcome. This makes the CEO survive longer in general. Lower
skilled CEOs surviving longer than they should will harm the value of the firm. However
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Figure 1.9: Unconditional firing percentage of CEO with skill θ = 0, 1, 2 when the CEO is allowed to
engage in short-term action.
notice that not only the lower skilled CEO but also the higher skilled CEO gets fired less at
the early stages of their tenure. This implies that allowing the CEO to engage in short-term
action can prevent the board from accidently firing high skilled CEOs due to some bad luck
in the early stages in their tenure. This shows that CEO’s playing some short-term action can
sometimes be beneficial for the firm.
There are two main points to take away from this section. One is that the lower skilled
CEO is more likely to engage in short-term action. This could lead to low skilled CEO to
survive longer than he should which is harmful to firm value. In addition the CEO tends
to focus more on the short-term when they are close to getting fired. This relates to the first
point since the lower skilled CEO is closer to getting fired than the higher skilled CEO. This
shows that the threat of getting replaced induces the CEO to focus more on the short-term
performance. Even thought it is essential to replace the low skilled CEO to maximize firm




In this section I illustrate how the model prediction changes with change in parameters. I
illustrate how the results change when the there is a change in persistence parameter φ, the
standard deviation of the profits ση ,the cost of firing C f and the effectiveness of the short-term
action Ca. Parameters take the value β = 0.99, µ0 = 1, σ0 = 1, φ = 0.8, C f = 8, ση = 3, Ca = 4
if not mentioned.
Figure 1.10: Average actions taken by the CEO for each Ca = 3, 4. Average is taken among θ and
{ηt}60t=1.
Figure 1.10 shows the average actions taken by the CEO versus CEO tenure for two
Ca = 3, 4. The average is taken among θ and {ηt}60t=1. Naturally increasing the effectiveness
of the short-term action will increase the short-term action taken by the CEO.
Figure 1.11 shows the average actions taken by the CEO for two for two C f = 8, 10
Increasing the cost of firing will decrease the firing threshold since it becomes less worth to
fire a CEO. Therefore the CEO’s job becomes more secure which allows them focus more on
long-term.
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Figure 1.11: Average actions taken by the CEO for each C f = 8, 10. Average is taken among θ and
{ηt}60t=1.
Figure 1.12: Average actions taken by the CEO for each φ = 0.8, 0.95. Average is taken among θ and
{ηt}60t=1.
Figure 1.12 shows average actions taken by the CEO for two φ = 0.8, 0.95. Increasing
the persistence parameter φ will have two effects. First as shown in the previous section
it increases the firing threshold since having a low skilled CEO is more punishing to the
firm. This should increase the incentive to play more short-term action. Second, it makes the
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short-term action more harmful for firm value. This makes the disutility that the CEO incur
from decline in share value caused short-term action increases. In this example, the second
effect mostly outweighs the first effect.
1.3.5 The Cost of Short-term Action
In this section I analyze how CEO’s action affects firm value.
Figure 1.13: Value of the firm
Figure 1.13 plots the value of the firm versus the CEO skill θ. Recall that the value of the
firm is given by equation (1.2.1) which is the discounted sum of profits.
Notice that the value of the firm is more or less flat below θ = 1. This is a little unintuitive
since it is natural to think that hiring a higher skilled CEO is always better for the firm, hence
the value should be monotonically increasing in CEO skill. However, the lower skilled CEOs
are more likely to get fired at the early stage of their tenure which allows the firm to hire a
new CEO. For example although the CEO with skill θ = 0.5 will generate more discounted
profit over any fixed amount of period than the CEO with θ = 0, since the CEO with skill
θ = 0 is more likely to get fired earlier than the CEO with skill θ = 0.5, hiring the CEO with
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skill θ = 0 could be better for the firm. Having more or less a flat value function below θ = 1
means that benefit from having higher skill is cancelled out from the effect mentioned above
for skill θ < 1. This shows that risk of hiring a low skilled CEO is fairly low since the board
has the option to fire the CEO. This also relates to the previous result that the board prefers
CEOs with higher variances since the downward risk is capped.
Obviously value of the firm is higher in the benchmark case since then short-term action is
not allowed. However, notice that the difference between the benchmark case and the model
case is small when the high skilled CEO is hired. There are at least 2 reasons for this. First, as
shown in the previous section, a high skilled CEO less likely to engage in short-term action.
Thus the difference between the benchmark case and the model case becomes small. Another
reason is that some level of short-term action could be beneficial for the firm. This is because
CEO playing some level of short-term action could prevent the board from accidentally firing
the high skilled CEO. Especially in the early stages of CEO tenure, even a high skilled CEO
are at risk of losing his job due to bad luck. So in the early stages of the CEO’s tenure, even
the highly skilled CEO may engage in some level of short-term action which will protect
them from getting fired. Even though this action will harm the health of the firm, it could be
beneficial for the firm as well since the firm is more likely to keep the highly skilled CEO.
The CEO engaging in short-term action has at least two effects on firm value. First, the
CEO engaging in short-term action deters firms future profitability. As mentioned before,
engaging in short-term action will change the discounted sum of profits by Ca · at −
at
1− β · φ .
Assumption 1 ensures that this value is negative. Hence, engaging in short-term action has
a negative effect on firm value. Second, the CEO engaging in short-term action prevents
the board from updating the CEO’s skill properly. Since the board uses realized profits to
updated about the CEO’s skill based on the assumption that at = 0 for t, the CEO engaging in
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short-term action can disrupt the boards beliefs about the CEO’s skill. In order to characterize
these 2 effects I compare the value of the firm between the benchmark case (at = 0 for all t)
and the model case which is the case where the CEO is allowed to engage in short-term action.
The table below shows the value of the firm at time 0 when h0 = 0 for 3 cases for different
parameters.
Table 1.1: Effects of Short-term Actions on Firm Value
V1(model) V2(benchmark) V3(no firing) Loss1 Loss2 V2-V1
Ca = 3, C f = 8 692 714 480 22.3 0.074 22.4
Ca = 4, C f = 8 688 714 480 19.3 6.98 26.3
Ca = 3, C f = 10 671 691 480 19.6 0.38 20.0
Ca = 4, C f = 10 668 691 480 16.8 6.73 23.5
• V1 denotes the value of the firm in the model case where the CEO can engage in positive
short-term action.
• V2 denotes the value of the firm in the benchmark case where the CEO always plays
at = 0.
• V3 denotes the value of the firm in the no firing case where the board never fires the
CEO and therefore CEO always survives for 60 periods.
• Loss 1 is the first effect mentioned above which is the direct loss from the short-term
profit.
• Loss 2 is the calculated as V2− V1− Loss1. This describes second effect mentioned
above which is the loss caused from the board not able to update the CEO skill properly.
Table shows that Loss 1 is more significant compared to Loss 2. This relates to the previous
point where manipulating the firm’s belief is sometime beneficial to the firm since it can
prevent the firm from firing a high skilled CEO. As we can see from figure 13, the value of the
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firm is almost flat at lower levels of θ but starts increasing once θ reach a certain level. This
implies that it is extremely important to not accidentally fire a high skilled CEO. So when
the firm is hiring a high skilled CEO, the CEO boosting the board’s beliefs about his skill
is beneficial for the firm. When the firm is hiring a low skilled CEO, the CEO boosting the
board’s beliefs about his skill may prevent the firm from firing the CEO, which leads to a
loss in firm value. However, even if the low skilled CEO try to manipulate the board’s belief,
the board will eventually find out that the CEO is low skilled and he will get fired in a few
periods. On the other hand, accidentally firing a high skilled CEO means that the firm have
lost out on the value that the high skilled CEO could have created for 60 periods. Hence, the
loss from keeping the low skilled CEO for an extra few periods is marginal compared to the
potential loss from accidentally firing a high skilled CEO. Therefore, even though the belief
manipulation from the low skilled CEO happens more often than the belief manipulation
from the high skilled CEO, the loss from the belief manipulation becomes marginal. However,
notice that once the effectiveness of the short-term action Ca increases from 3 to 4, Loss 1
declines and Loss 2 becomes more significant. Loss 1 decreasing is intuitive since the short-
term action is more effective the direct loss from engaging in short-term action which is given
by Ca · at −
at
1− β · φ will decrease. However, as shown in Figure 10, increasing Ca will result
in CEO focusing more on the short-term which increases at. Also increase in Ca means that
board’s belief about the CEO skill is disrupted more by the short-term action at. This leads to
low skilled CEO surviving much longer than they should, which increases Loss 2 as a result.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper develops dynamic model in which the CEOs can manipulate their performance
measure at the expense of firm value. Instead of focusing on the conflict of interest between
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principal and the agent regarding the agent’s effort level, I focus on the conflict of interest
regarding the allocation of the agent’s effort between the short-term and the long-term. The
model features learning where the board learns about the CEO’s skill based on performance
and makes a decision whether to keep or fire the CEO. The CEO can perform an action which
boosts the short-term profit but deters long-term profitability of the firm. While the board
only cares about the value of the firm, the CEO cares both about his job security and the
value of the firm. By solving the model numerically I analyze the CEO’s behavior and how
the conflict of interest between the board and the CEO affect the value of the firm. I find
that CEO with lower skill are more likely to focus on the short-term performance. Also the
CEO who are close to getting fired tend to focus more on short-term performance. The CEO
focusing on short-term performance not only deteriorates the firms future profitability but
also prevents firms from making optimal firing decisions. Furthermore, I find that inefficiency
caused by firms not able to update the skill of the CEO is smaller compared to the inefficiency
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Chapter 2




Is it appropriate to use the linear quantile regression (QR) for causal inference? To answer
this question, we study relationships among the linear QR, the conditional quantile function
(CQF), and general structural functions. First, we show that the slope parameter of the linear
QR represents a weighted average of the local slopes of the CQF. Second, we cite an existing
result demonstrating that the slope of the CQF represents a weighted average of the structural
partial effects. Third, by chaining these two arguments, we show that the slope parameter of
the linear QR represents a weighted average of the structural partial effects. Our results imply
that the linear QR can be used for structural causal inference in the presence of nonlinearity
and multiple unobserved heterogeneity.
Endogeneity and misspecification could be two major obstacles in using the linear QR for
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causal inference. Since an extensive body of the econometrics literature has solved the endo-
geneity issue in various contexts,1 we assume exogeneity and focus on the misspecification
problem throughout this paper. The linear QR generally misspecifies the true causal structure
in two ways. First, the linearity of the linear QR fails to capture the nonlinearity of general
structural functions.2 Second, the monotonicity of the linear QR with respect to a scalar latent
variable fails to capture the non-monotonicity of general structural functions with respect to
generally multivariate unobservables. Despite these two sources of potential misspecification,
what we develop in this paper reconciles the linear QR with the true causal structure.
It is a well-known feature of the ordinary least squares (OLS) method that it minimizes
the average squared distance between the linear regression function and the conditional
expectation function (CEF). In fact, the OLS does not only minimize the fit. Yitzhaki (1996)
and Angrist and Krueger (1999) show that the OLS slope coefficient under misspecification
can be explicitly written as weighted average derivatives of the CEF. This result is viewed
by empirical researchers to be useful for an interpretation of regression coefficients.3 One
contribution of this paper is to provide a generalization of this weighted-average-derivatives
interpretation for arbitrary linear functions that minimize weighted mean squared distances.
Our result applies to the linear QR in particular, since Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-
Val (2006) show that the linear QR parameters minimize a weighted average of squared
distances between the linear function and the CQF.4
In Section 2.2, we show that the slope parameter of the linear QR equals a weighted
average of the local slopes of the CQF. In Section 2.4, we use the existing result that the slope
of the CQF equals a weighted average of the structural partial effects. We provide a framework
1See Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) and many subsequent papers.
2In addition to causal interpretation, the linear misspecification of the linear QR can cause the problem of quantile
crossing. Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, and Galichon (2010) propose rearrangement as a solution.
3Furthermore, even under endogeneity, the two-stage least squares have the weighted-average interpretation for
discrete treatment effects (Angrist and Imbens, 1995).
4Lee (2014) provides an alternative measure of fit for the linear QR parameters.
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for claiming the two auxiliary results together to show that the slope parameter of the linear
QR equals a weighted average of the structural partial effects, even if the underlying structural
function is nonlinear in the explanatory variable and/or is non-monotone with respect to
possibly multivariate latent variable(s). We therefore conclude in Section 2.6 that linear QR
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978)5 is a useful tool for causal inference in the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity, even if it misspecifies the true structure both in terms of nonlinearity and
non-monotonicity. A couple of extensions to the baseline result are presented in Section 2.3,
and we also argue that the same conclusion applies to the linear regression in Section 2.5 as
well as the linear QR.
2.2 Relationship between Linear and Nonlinear Functions
2.2.1 General Setting
We first introduce basic definitions and fix relevant notations. Let Y and X denote dependent
and independent variables supported on Y ⊂ R and X ⊂ R, respectively. Let B(X ) denote
the Borel sigma algebra on X . First, we present an auxiliary lemma that a nonlinear function
and a linear function related by a minimum weighted mean squared distance have at least
two intersection points. Let M : X → R be a general function and L : X → R be an affine
function specified by the parametric form L(x) = α + βx. We state the following assumption
for these two functions and the distribution of X.
Assumption 3. (i)E[M(X)2] and E[X2] are finite. (ii) (α, β) uniquely solves min(a,b) E[ω(X) ·
(M(X) − a − bX)2] for some weight function ω : X → R, where ω(x) ≥ 0 a.e. (iii) ω(X) is
bounded a.s. (iv) M is continuous. (v) X is convex. (vi) X is continuously distributed.
In this assumption, the linear function L is characterized as the unique weighted least
5See also Koenker and Hallock (2001), Koenker (2005), and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2013) for surveys.
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squares approximation to the nonlinear function M. This applies to the relation between the
linear regression function L and the CEF M, for example. In addition, this also applies to the
relation between the linear QR function L and the CQF M by Angrist, Chernozhukov, and
Fernández-Val (2006). The current section proceeds with a general setting, and we will branch
into these two concrete examples in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.
We first obtain the following auxiliary lemma with Assumption 3.
Lemma 1 (Existence of Two Intersection Points). If Assumption (3) is true, then M and L intersect
at least at two points in X .
A proof of this lemma is provided in Section B.1 in the appendix. We also present an
intuitive illustration of this lemma in Section 2.2.2, describing how the minimum weighted
mean-squares characterization leads to the existence of two intersection points. Applying
Lemma 1, we next claim that the slope β of L is a weighted average of the local slopes M′ of
M. To this end, we invoke an additional assumption that ensures that this derivative M′ of
interest exists.
Assumption 4. M is continuously differentiable.
An application of Lemma 1 and the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus yields the following
result.





∣∣ x1 6 X 6 x2]








for all x ∈ X .
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A proof of this theorem is provided in Section B.2 in the appendix, but it is straightforward
from Lemma 1. This result characterizes β as a weighted average of M′. Furthermore, note
that the weight function wx1,x2 is strictly positive on [x1, x2]. In other words, the slope β
of L represents a strict convex combination of the local slopes M′ of M within an interval
[x1, x2] ⊂ X , which is guaranteed to be non-empty.
To mathematically formalize the weighted-average interpretation, we define the function




wx1,x2(x)dFX(x) for each T ∈ B(X ). (2.2.1)
Note that this λx1,x2 can be shown to be a probability measure. With this notation, the






In other words, the slope β of L is the mean of the local slopes M′ of M with respect to the
probability measure λx1,x2 defined in (2.2.1).
A remaining question is whether there can exist more than two intersection points. In
general, there may exist more than two. For example, in the extreme case where M is also an
affine function, the minimum weighted mean squared distance restriction necessarily leads
to L = M, and there exists a continuum of intersection points. Note that, in this affine case,
one can take any pair of points, x1 and x2, from X to form the weight function wx1,x2 defined
in Theorem 1, since β = L′ = M′ holds globally. In general, when there exist more than two
intersection points between L and M, we can choose any pair of those intersection points,




We provide an intuitive illustration for Lemma 1, where we claim that there exist at least two
intersection points of M and L in X . Since L minimizes the weighted mean squared distance
from M, no other affine function can have a strictly smaller w-weighted mean squared distance
from the function M than the affine function L. This restriction plays the major role in our
theoretical and intuitive arguments.
By way of contradiction, assume that L and M have less than two intersection points in
X . We can then branch into three representative cases, illustrated by (a)–(c) in Figure 2.1.
Panel (a) shows a case where there is no intersection point. In this case, either L−M > 0
or L−M < 0 is true by the continuity of M. If L−M < 0 like the graph, then shifting L
upward to produce L̃ would achieve a smaller weighted mean squared distance between M
and L̃ than between M and L, contradicting the premise that L minimizes the weighted mean
squared distance from M. Thus, we rule out case (a) of zero intersection point.
Panels (b) and (c) show cases where there is only one intersection point. In these cases,
rotating and/or shifting L to produce L̃ would achieve a smaller weighted mean squared
distance between M and L̃ than between M and L, contradicting the characterization of L as
the minimizer of the weighted mean squared distance from M. Thus, we rule out cases (b)
and (c) of one intersection point.
While this illustration is intuitive, establishing the existence of such a rotation and/or
shift to achieve a strictly smaller weighted mean squared distance is not necessarily a trivial
problem, except in case (a). We refer readers to Section B.1 in the appendix for mathematical
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Figure 2.1: Illustrations of why M and L must have at least two intersection points. Panel (a) shows
a case where there is no intersection point. Panels (b) and (c) show cases where there is only one
intersection point. In each of these cases, moving L to L̃ may reduce the weighted mean squared
distance from M, and hence L cannot minimize the weighted mean squared distance.
40
2.2.3 Linear QR and CQF
We demonstrate an application of Theorem 1 to the case of quantile regressions. For a given
τ ∈ (0, 1), the τ-th CQF Qτ : X → Y is defined by
Qτ(x) = inf{y | FY|X(y | x) > τ},
where FY|X(y | x) denotes the conditional cumulative distribution function of Y given X,
which is assumed to be regularly defined throughout the paper. The τ-th linear QR Lτ
provides the best linear prediction of Y given X under the loss function ρτ(u) : R → R
defined by ρτ(u) = (τ − 1(u 6 0)) · u, called the check function. In other words, Lτ(x) =
α(τ) + β(τ)x where (α(τ), β(τ)) satisfies
(α(τ), β(τ)) ∈ arg min
(α,β)∈Θ
E[ρτ(Y− α− βX)]
for some parameter set Θ ⊂ R2. Note that we have Qτ 6= Lτ in general.
Angrist, Chernozhukov, and Fernández-Val (ACF, 2006; Theorem 2) show that, under the
following assumption, the linear QR minimizes a weighted mean squared distance from the
CQF. We state their results below.
Assumption 5 (ACF, 2006). (i) The conditional density fY|X( · | X) exists and is bounded a.s. (ii)
E[Y], E[Qτ(X)2], and EX2 are finite. (iii) (α(τ), β(τ)) uniquely solves min(α,β) E[ρτ(Y− α− βX)].
Theorem 2 (ACF, 2006; Theorem 2). If Assumption 5 is true, then (α(τ), β(τ)) uniquely solves
the weighted least squares problem
min
α,β
E[ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · (Lτ −Qτ)2(X, α, β)], (2.2.3)
where ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) is defined by





fY|X(uLτ(x) + (1− u)Qτ(x) | x) du.
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To claim that the slope β(τ) of the τ-th linear QR Lτ is a weighted average of the slopes
Q′τ of the CQF, we now invoke an additional assumption that the support of X is convex and
that the derivative Q′τ of interest exists.
Assumption 6. (i) X is convex. (ii) Qτ is continuously differentiable. (iii) X is continuously
distributed.
Note that Assumptions 5 and 6 imply Assumption 3 by Theorem 2. Note also that
Assumption 6 (ii) implies Assumption 4. Combining Theorems 1 and 2 together, therefore, we
get the following corollary that the slope β(τ) of the τ-th linear QR Lτ is a weighted average
of the slopes Q′τ of the CQF.
Corollary 1 (Weighted Average: CQF). If Assumptions 5 and 6 are true, then there exist x1, x2 ∈ X






∣∣ x1 6 X 6 x2]
holds, where the weight function wx1,x2 is defined in Theorem 1.
As in the general case, this result can be formally interpreted as a weighted average based







2.2.4 Linear Regressions and CEF
While the main focus of this paper is on quantile regressions, we demonstrate in the current
subsection an application of Theorem 1 to the case of mean regressions. The linear regression
Lm is a linear function which gives the minimum mean-squared-errors prediction of Y given
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X, i.e., Lm(x) = α + βx where
(α, β) ∈ arg min
(a,b)
E[(Y− a− bX)2].
In addition, the linear regression also provides the minimum mean-squared-distance approxi-
mation to the CEF, i.e., Lm also satisfies
(α, β) ∈ arg min
(a,b)
E[(m(X)− a− bX)2],
where m : X → R denotes the CEF. The approximation properties of the linear regression
have been emphasized by White (1980), Chamberlain (1984), Goldberger (1991), and Angrist
and Krueger (1999), among others. To apply Theorem 1 to the mean regressions, we state the
following assumptions.
Assumption 7. (i) E[Y2] and E[X2] are finite. (ii) (α, β) uniquely solves min(a,b) E[(Y− a− bX)2].
(iii) X is convex. (iv) X is continuously distributed. (v) m is continuously differentiable.
Note that, if (α, β) uniquely solves min(a,b) E[(Y − a − bX)2], then (α, β) also uniquely
solves min(a,b) E[(m(X)− a− bX)2]. Therefore, Assumption 7 implies Assumptions 3 and 4,
and we consequently obtain from Theorem 1 the following corollary that the slope β of the
linear regression Lm is a weighted average of the slopes m′ of the CEF.
Corollary 2 (Weighted Average: CEF). If Assumption 7 is true, then there exist x1, x2 ∈ X with
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holds, where the weight function wx1,x2 is defined in Theorem 1.
As in the general case, this result can be formally interpreted as a weighted average based
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We conclude this section with a remark about existing results that derive weighted average
interpretations for the OLS slope parameter. Yitzhaki (1996; Proposition 2) shows that the
OLS slope parameter can be written as a weighted average of the local slopes of the CEF with




[E[X] · FX(x)−ΘX(x)] =
FX(x)
Var(X)
(E[X]− E[X|X ≤ x]),
where ΘX(x) =
∫ x
−∞ t f (t)dt = FX(x)E[X|X ≤ x]. Likewise, Angrist and Krueger (1999; page








where ξ(x) derives from the mean value expansion around 0, and is thus between 0 and x. If




ξ ′(ξ−1(x)) · fX(x) · E[X2]
.
The weight function wY of Yitzhaki, the weight function wAK of Angrist and Krueger,
and our weight function wx1,x2 defined in Theorem 1 are different from each other. The
linear regression slope parameter can thus admit multiple weights for the weighted-average
interpretation. Each of the different weights can provide a unique way of interpretation. For
example, wY has an advantage in that it is strictly positive on the support X , while wx1,x2 has
a truncated support [x1, x2] ⊂ X . Thus, Yitzhaki’s result is useful for interpreting the slope
parameter as a weighted average over the entire population. A similar remark applies to the
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weight of Angrist and Krueger, except for the zero weight at the point x = 0. On the other
hand, wx1,x2 allows for a more intuitive interpretation as the inverse probability weighting.
Thus, our result is useful for interpreting the slope parameter as a standardized average over
a subpopulation. Because all the weights are true anyway, empirical practitioners can take
advantage of all the convenient interpretations.
2.3 Extensions
This section presents a couple of extensions to the baseline result. First, we demonstrate that
our basic idea also applies to the case of discrete regressors. Second, we demonstrate that our
result also extends to the case of multivariate regressors.
2.3.1 The Result for the Case of Discrete Regressors
The main result (Theorem 1) was obtained assuming that the regressor X is continuously
distributed. In the current section, we argue that a similar idea applies to the case of a discrete
regressor, which is very common in economic applications.6 As we move from a continuous
distribution to a discrete distribution, we also change the object of interest from derivatives to
differences. The following short-hand notations are introduced.
β = ∆L(x) := L(x′)− L(x)
∆M(x) := M(x′)−M(x)
where x′ = min{x̃ ∈ X |x̃ > x}. As in the continuous case, we first prove an auxiliary lemma
under the following assumption.
Assumption 8. (i) E[M(X)2] and E[X2] are finite. (ii) (α, β) uniquely solves min(a,b) E[ω(X) ·
6We thank K. Kato for suggesting this extension.
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(M(X)− a− bX)2]. (iii) ω(X) is bounded for all x ∈ X . (iv) X ⊂ Z and |X | > 2.
This assumption is analogous to Assumption 3, which we made for the case of continuous
X. Compared to that assumption, the current assumption drops the continuity of M and
the continuous distribution of X. Instead, it adds the restriction that X is integer-valued,
although it can be relaxed to arbitrary discrete supports with isolated points. Under this
assumption, we obtain the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2. If Assumption 8 is true, then there exist two distinct points x1, x2 ∈ X such that
(∆L(x1)− ∆M(x1)) · (∆L(x2)− ∆M(x2)) 6 0 holds.
A proof is found in Section B.3 in the appendix. It is proved analogously to the logic used
in the proof of Lemma 1, which we developed for the case of continuous X. This lemma claims
that there is some point x1 ∈ X at which β = ∆L(x1) > ∆M(x1) is true and another point
x2 ∈ X at which β = ∆L(x2) 6 ∆M(x2) is true. In other words, the slope parameter β of the
linear function is bounded from both above and below by the differences ∆M. This property
immediately implies that β can be written as a convex combination of {∆M(x) | x ∈ X}, as
formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If Assumption 8 is true, then
β(τ) = E[w̃(X) · ∆M(X)]
holds for a non-negative weight function w̃ such that E[w̃(X)] = 1.
A proof is provided in Section B.4 in the appendix. While our proof constructs a particular
weight function w to establish the equality, such a weight function need not be unique.
Like the case of continuous regressors, we can apply Theorem 3 to quantile regressions in
particular. Let ∆Qτ(x) := Qτ(x′)−Qτ(x). The following corollary follows from Theorem 3.
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Corollary 3. If Assumption 5 and Assumption 8(iv) are true, then
β(τ) = E[w̃(X) · ∆Qτ(X)]
holds for a non-negative weight function w̃ such that E[w̃(X)] = 1.
Likewise, we can apply Theorem 3 to mean regressions as well. Let ∆m(x) := m(x′)−
m(x). The following corollary follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 4. If Assumption 7(i)–(ii) and Assumption 8(iv) are true, then
β(τ) = E[w̃(X) · ∆m(X)]
holds for a non-negative weight function w̃ such that E[w̃(X)] = 1.
2.3.2 The Result for the Case of Multivariate Regressors
The main result (Theorem 1) was obtained assuming that the regressor X is univariate. In the
current section, we argue that a similar idea applies to the case of a multivariate regressor. To
this goal, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 9. (i) E[M(X)2] and E ‖X‖2 are finite. (ii) α ∈ R and β ∈ Rk uniquely solve
min(a,b) E[ω(X) · (M(X)− a− X′b)2] for some weight function ω : X → R, where ω(x) ≥ 0
a.e. (iii) ω(X) is bounded a.s. (iv) M is twice continuously differentiable. (v) X = Rk. (vi) X is
continuously distributed. (vii) There exists C > 0 such that
∂2M(x)
∂x2i
> C for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k for all
x ∈ X .
Parts (i)–(vi) of this assumption are analogous to Assumption 3. In addition, part (vii)
requires the nonlinear function M be convex.7 In econometrics, it is not unusual to impose
7We impose this additional assumption as we move from univariate X to multivariate X, because multivariate
extension is not straightforward otherwise. Similar difficulties arose also for the weighted-average interpretations of
the linear regressions by Yitzhaki (1996) and Angrist and Krueger (1999).
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such shape restrictions, in light of the fact that many functions in economics must be convex
or concave to satisfy important economic properties. We can substitute the assumption that
M is concave, and arguments below then can be straightforwardly modified by reversing the
inequalities. With x−1 denoting the (k− 1)-dimensional subvector (x2, x3, ...xk)′ of x, we state
the following two auxiliary lemmas that follow from the preceding assumption.
Lemma 3. If Assumption 9 is true, then there exists x ∈ X such that L(x) > M(x).
Lemma 4. Under Assumption 9, if there exists x∗ ∈ X such that L(x∗) > M(x∗), then L( · , x∗−1)
and M( · , x∗−1) intersect at two distinct points.
Proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4 are provided in Sections B.5 and B.6 in the appendix, respectively.
Like the main result, an application of the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus together with
these auxiliary lemmas yields the following weighted-average interpretation result.
















for all x ∈ X ,
where
D := {x ∈ X |L(x) > M(x)},
D−1 := {x−1 ∈ Rk−1| ∃x1 ∈ R s.t. L(x) > M(x)},
x′′1 (x−1) = max{x1 ∈ R|L(x1, x−1) = M(x1, x−1)}, and
x′1(x−1) = min{x1 ∈ R|L(x1, x−1) = M(x1, x−1)}.
48
A proof is provided in Section B.7 in the appendix. We remark that this proof in particular
shows that the weight function wD is well-defined, as its denominator is strictly positive.
2.4 Linear QR and Structural Functions
A general class of structural functions can be expressed by a nonseparable function g :
X × U → Y where U ⊂ RM. The cumulative distribution function of U is denoted by FU .
Letting U denote an M-dimensional random vector of unobserved variables supported on U ,
we can use g to write the relation among (Y, X, U) by
Y = g(X, U).
In the subsequent subsections, we explore relationships between the slopes of the linear QR
and the structural partial effects ∂g/∂x, where the latter object measures the ceteris paribus
causal effects of X on Y.
2.4.1 Monotone Structural Functions
It is known that, if X is exogenous and g is monotone with respect to a scalar U, i.e., M = 1,
then the CQF Qτ can be used to represent the structural function g. Specifically, if M = 1
and g(x, · ) is increasing for each x ∈ X , then Qτ(x) = g(x, u) holds for all x ∈ X where
τ = FU(u). In this case, Corollary 1 implies that the slope β(τ) of the τ-th linear QR Lτ
identifies a weighted average of the structural partial effects ∂g/∂x. We formally present this
implication as the following corollary.
Corollary 5 (Weighted Average: Monotone Structural Function). Suppose that M = 1, g(x, · )
is monotone for each x ∈ X , g is continuously differentiable, and X is exogenous. If Assumptions 5
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holds, where the weight function wx1,x2 is defined in Theorem 1.
This result shows that the linear QR parameter β(τ) is useful for us to learn about the
structural partial effects ∂g/∂x when the structural function g is monotone with respect to a
scalar latent variable U. In the next subsection, we explore an interpretation of β(τ) while
relaxing this monotonicity assumption.
2.4.2 General Structural Functions
We claim that the linear QR parameter can be still expressed as a weighted average of the
structural partial effects even if the monotonicity assumption used in Corollary 5 is dropped.
To this end, we combine our Corollary 1 with a result that exists in the literature, which
connects the slope Q′τ of the CQF to the structural partial effects ∂g/∂x under an arbitrary
dimension M of the latent variables U.
We define the lower contour set V(y, x) = {u ∈ RM | g(x, u) 6 y}. Its boundary is
denoted by ∂V(y, x). Next, we define the algebra B(y, x) := {S ∩ ∂V(y, x) | S ∈ B(RM)}
on ∂V(y, x), where B(RM) is the Borel σ-algebra. Note that every element S ∈ B(y, x) is
also a Borel set. Let mM denote the Lebesgue measure on RM, and let HM−1 denote the
(M− 1)-dimensional Hausdorff measure restricted to (∂V(y, x),B(y, x)). The velocities of
the boundary ∂V(y, x) at u with respect to a change in y and a change in x are denoted
by ∂υ(y, x; u)/∂y and ∂υ(y, x; u)/∂x, respectively. With Σ denoting an (M− 1)-dimensional
rectangle, the boundary ∂V(·, ·) can be represented by a map Σ× Y × X → RM, i.e., the
(M− 1)-dimensional manifold ∂V(y, x) can be parameterized through a map π(y,x) : Σ →
∂V(y, x) for each (y, x) ∈ Y × X . The velocity ∂υ(y, · ; ·)/∂x of the boundary with respect
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to a change in x can be represented by a map X → L1(Σ) for each y ∈ Y , provided that
the function ∂υ(y, x ; ·)/∂x : ∂V(y, x) → RM is absolutely integrable with respect to the
parameterization over Σ for each (y, x) ∈ Y ×X . Similarly, ∂υ(·, x ; ·)/∂y can be represented
by a map Y → L1(Σ) for each x ∈ X , provided absolute integrability. We cite the following
assumption and auxiliary lemma, which follows from an application of a conservation law
for fluid mechanics – details and discussions can be found in Sasaki (2015).
Assumption 10. (i) g is continuously differentiable. (ii) ‖∇ug(x, ·)‖ 6= 0 on ∂V(y, x). (iii) The




(v) ∂V(y, ·) ∈ C1(Σ× X ; RM) holds for each y ∈ Y , and ∂V(·, x) ∈ C1(Σ× Y ; RM) holds for
each x ∈ X . (vi) ∂υ(y, · ; ·)/∂x ∈ C1(X ; L1(Σ)) holds for each y ∈ Y , and ∂υ(·, x ; ·)/∂y ∈
C1(Y ; L1(Σ)) holds for each x ∈ X . (vii) X is exogenous. (viii) There exist values p > 1 and q > 1
satisfying p−1 + q−1 = 1 such that ‖γ(x, · )‖Lp(∂V(y,x),HM−1) < ∞ and ‖ fU‖Lq(∂V(y,x),HM−1) < ∞
hold, where γ(x, u) := ‖∇ug(x, u)‖−1.











for all S ∈ B(y, x)
is a probability measure on (∂V(y, x),B(y, x)), and the slope Q′τ of the CQF at τ = FY|X(y|x) can







To make this auxiliary result applicable to our framework, we take an additional step of
translating the constructed probability measure µy,x into a regular conditional probability
measure on B(U ) given the events in B(X ). We define the function µτ : B(U )×X → [0, 1]
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by
µτ(S, x) = µQτ(x),x(S ∩ ∂V(Qτ(x), x)). (2.4.1)
By the following lemma, claiming that this µτ is a regular conditional probability measure,





∣∣∣∣X = x] . (2.4.2)
Lemma 6. If Assumption 10 is satisfied, then µτ is a regular conditional probability measure on
B(U ) given the events in B(X ).
A proof of this lemma is found in Section B.8 in the appendix. We remark that this
weighted measure µτ need not be the unique conditional probability measure that relates
Q′τ and ∂g/∂x. For instance, Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, Hoderlein, Holzmann, and
Newey (2015) show that Q′τ can be written as an unweighted average of ∂g/∂x under a partial
monotonicity assumption in the presence of multiple unobservables. Since the measure
µτ does not necessarily simplify to the uniform measure under the partial monotonicity
assumption, weights connecting Q′τ and ∂g/∂x need not be unique.
Thus far, we have developed a marginal probability measure λx1,x2 on B(X ) defined in
(2.2.1), and a regular conditional probability measure µτ on B(U ) given the events in B(X )
defined in (2.4.1). Combining the respective mean (2.2.4) and the conditional mean (2.4.2)













We formally state this result as the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Weighted Average: General Structural Function). If Assumptions 5, 6, and 10
are true, then there exist a marginal probability measure λx1,x2 on B(X ) and a regular conditional
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This result formally characterizes the slope parameter β(τ) of the τ-th linear QR Lτ as a
weighted average of the structural partial effects ∂g/∂x with respect to the measure µτ×λx1,x2 .
Because the weights are strictly positive on the interval [x1, x2], the slope parameter of the
linear QR represents a strict convex combination of the structural partial effects within
the interval. This implies that, if β(τ) is positive, for example, there exists a nontrivial
subpopulation in [x1, x2] such that the structural partial effects are positive. In other words,
even if the linear QR is quite different from the structural function, the linear QR can be useful
for inference of the structural causal effects.
2.5 Linear Regressions and Structural Functions
While the main contribution of this paper is about quantile regressions, we show in this
section that the linear regression parameter can be similarly expressed as a weighted average
of the structural partial effects. Let λU be the probability measure of U supported on U . We
state the following assumption.
Assumption 11. (i) g is continuously differentiable. (ii) g(x, · ) ∈ L1(λU) for every x ∈ X . (iii)
There exists some function h ∈ L1(λU) such that
∣∣∣∣∂g(x, u)∂x
∣∣∣∣ 6 h(u) for all (x, u) ∈ X × U .
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We formally state this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 (Weighted Average: Linear Regression and General Structural Function). If As-







This result formally characterizes the slope parameter β of the linear regression Lm as a
weighted average of the structural partial effects ∂g/∂x with respect to the measure λU ×
λx1,x2 . Because the weights are strictly positive on the interval [x1, x2], the slope parameter of
the linear regression represents a strict convex combination of the structural partial effects
within the interval. Therefore, even if the linear regression is quite different from the structural
function, it can be useful for inference of the structural causal effects.
2.6 Conclusion
The slope parameter of the linear QR can be written as weighted averages of the local slopes
of the CQF among a nontrivial subpopulation of individuals. Likewise, the slope parameter
of the linear regression can be written as weighted averages of the local slopes of the CEF
among a nontrivial subpopulation of individuals. These results follow from the property that
the linear and nonlinear functions related by weighted least squares must have at least two
intersection points. We present an intuitive illustration as well as a formal derivation of this
result.
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When the structural function g is monotone with respect to a scalar latent variable U, the
structural function can be represented by the CQF Qτ . Therefore, our first result directly
implies that the slope parameter β(τ) of the τ-th linear QR measures a weighted average
of the structural partial effects ∂g/∂x. Furthermore, even if the structural function g fails to
exhibit monotonicity, we establish that the slope parameter β(τ) still measures a weighted
average of the structural partial effects ∂g/∂x. We also obtain a similar result for the linear
regression.
From these findings, we conclude that the linear regression and the linear QR can be used
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Chapter 3
IV Quantile Regression under
Misspecification
3.1 Introduction
The linear quantile regression has been an important tool to model unobserved heterogeneity.
While the linear quantile regression is an attractive tool to to capture the quantile specific
effects, there are two major obstacles. One is endogeneity and the other is misspecification.
There are several interpretation of the linear quantile regression when linear model of the
conditional quantile function is misspecified. Angrist, Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val
(2006) show that the parameters of the linear quantile regression minimize the weighted
average of squared distances between the linear quantile regression. This result parallels
the feature of the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates that minimize the average squares
distance between the linear regression and the true conditional regression. Kato and Sasaki
(2015) extends their result and shows that the slope parameter of the linear quantile regression
represents a weighted average of the slopes of the conditional quantile function. They also
show that slope parameter of the linear quantile regression represents a weighted average
of the slopes of the general structural function. Lee (2014) also gives another fit of measure
for the linear quantile regression parameter. However these interpretation assumes that
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the variable of interest is exogenous. In many cases in economics, variables of interests are
endogeneous making the quantile regression method inappropriate to recover the causal
effects of these variables on the quantiles of the outcome. Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005)
develop a model of quantile regressions in the presence of endogeneity and obtain conditions
for identification of the quantile regression without imposing any functional assumptions.
Chernozhukov and Hansen (2006) gives an estimation strategy of the quantile regression in
the presence of endogeneity.
In this paper, I analyze misspecification problem in the presence of endogeneity. We
study the relation between the linear quantile regression and the true quantile regression
when the variable of interest is endogenous. First, I show that when the linear model of
the quantile regression is misspecified, the slope parameter of the linear qunatile regression
minimizes a weighted mean squared error loss funtion for specification error. This result
is analogous to the result given in Angrist, Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val (2006) which
shows that parameters of the linear quantile regression minimize the weighted average
of squared distances between the linear quantile regression when the variable of interest
is exogenous. Extending this result, I show that the slope of the linear quantile regression
represents a weighted average of the slope of the true quantile regression. This result coincides
with the result given in Kato and Sasaki (2015) which shows that the slope parameter of the
linear quantile regression represents a weighted average of the slopes of the true conditional
quantile function when the variable of interest is exogenous.
3.2 Linear Quantile regression and Quantile regression
We first introduce some basic definitions and notations. Let Y be the outcome variable ,X
denote the treatment, which is possibly endogenous, and Z denote the instrumental variable
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supported on X ∈ R, Y ∈ R and Z ∈ R respectively. For a given τ ∈ (0, 1), theτ -th quantile
regression Qτ is implicitly defined as
E[(1{Y < Qτ(X)} − τ)|Z] = 0 a.s.
The τ-th linear quantile regression Lτ is given by minimizing the GMM criterion function. In
other words, Lτ(X) = α(τ) + β(τ) · X where the parameters (α(τ), β(τ)) is given by
(α(τ), β(τ)) = arg min
(α,β)
E[(1{Y < Qτ(X)} − τ) · Z]
In general, Lτ 6= Qτ . Also define a short hand notation
∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) : = α(τ) + β(τ)x−Qτ(x) = Lτ(x)−Qτ(x).
εt : = Y−Qτ(X)
I make a connection between Qτ and Lτ in the following section.
3.2.1 Weighted Mean Squared Error Minimization
The main result is that under regularity assumptions the slope β(τ) of the τ-th linear qunatile
regression Lτ can be explicitly written as a weighted average of the slopes Q′τ of the quantile
regression Qτ among a non-trivial subpopulation of individuals even when the treatment
is endogenous. To derive this conclusion, I start by showing that the slope of the linear
quantile regression minimizes the weighted means square approximation error between the
true quantile regression under the following assumption.
Assumption 12. (i) the conditional density fY(y|XZ) exists and is bounded a.s, (ii) E[Y], E[Qτ(X)]
and E‖X‖2 are finite, (iii) α(τ), β(τ) uniquely solves minα,β(E[(1{Y < α + βX} − τ) · Z])2 (iv)
Qτ(x) is continuous
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(v) Qτ(X) is identified i.e. E[(q(X)−Qτ(X)) ·
∫ 1
0 fY(u · (q(x)−Qτ(x))|X, Z)du] = 0 a.s implies
that q(x) = Qτ(x) a.s..
Many parts of Assumption 12 are inherited from the assumptions stated in Theorem 2 of
Angrist, Chernozhukov and Fernández-Val (2006).




E[ω̃τ(X, Z, α(τ), β(τ))∆2τ(X, α(τ), β)]
where






fY(u(α(τ) + β(τ)x) + (1− u)QY|X(τ|x)|XZ)du
The proof of this Theorem is provided in the appendix. Theorem 1 states that the slope
of the linear quantile regression minimizes the weighted means square approximation error
between the true quantile regression. This result is similar to the result given in Angrist,
Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val (2006) which analyzes the misspecification problem under
exogeneity. Theorem 1 implies that even in the presence of endogeneity, linear quantile
regression would have a similar approximation property.
3.2.2 Weighted Average Interpretation
By extending Theorem 7, we obtain an auxiliary lemma that for any τ ∈ (0, 1) the linear
quantile regression Lτ intersects with the quantile regression Qτ at least at two points of x in
the support X of X under the following additional assumption.
Assumption 13. (i)Qτ(0) = α(τ) (ii)X ⊂ R+ (iii) 0 ∈ X (iv)X is convex. (v) Z ⊂ R+
Assumption 13(i) normalizes the true quantile regression Qτ to ensure that Qτ and Lτ
intersects at least at one point.
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Lemma 7. If Assumption 12 and Assumption 13 are true, Lτ and Qτ intersect at least at two points
in X .
The proof of this lemma is shown in the appendix. It is proved analogously to the logic
used in the proof of Lemma 7 of Kato and Sasaki (2015) that they developed in the case
of exogenous X. To claim that the slope β(τ) of the τ-th linear quantile regression Lτ is a
weighted average of the slopes Q′τ of the quantile regression, we now invoke an additional
assumption that ensures that this derivative Q′τ of interest exists.
Assumption 14. Qτ is continuously differentiable.
Applying Lemma 7 and the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, we now obtain the
following result.






∣∣ 0 6 X 6 x1]








for all x ∈ X .
The proof is a straight forward application of the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus.
This theorem implies that the slope of the linear quantile regression represents the weighted
average of the slope of the true qunatile regression. Note that the weight function wx1 is strictly
positive in [0, x1]. In other words, the slope of the linear quantile regression represents a strict
convex combination of the slopes of the true quantile regression within an interval [0, x1] ∈ X





wx1,x2(x)dFX(x) for each T ∈ B(X ). (3.2.1)
62
Note that this λx1,x2 can be shown to be a probability measure. With this notation, the






In other words, the slope β(τ) of the τ-th linear quantile regression is the mean of the slopes
Q′τ of the quantile regression with respect to the probability measure λx1,x2 .
3.2.3 Discrete Case
The main result (Theorem 8) was obtained assuming that the regressor X is continuously
distributed. In the current sub-section, we show that a similar idea applies to the case of
a discrete regressor, which is very common in economic applications. As we move from a
continuous distribution to a discrete distribution, we also change the object of interest from
derivatives to differences. The following short-hand notations are introduced.
β(τ) = ∆Lτ(x) : = Lτ(x′)− Lτ(x)
∆Qτ(x) : = Qτ(x′)−Qτ(x)
The goal is to show that the slope β(τ) of the linear quantile regression Lτ can be expressed
as a weighted average of the differences ∆Qτ of the conditional quantile function. To this
goal, we use the following assumption.
Assumption 15. (i)Qτ(0) = α(τ) (ii) The conditional density fY|X( · | x) exists and is bounded
for each x ∈ X . (iii) E[Y], E[Qτ(X)] and EX2 are finite. (iv) (α(τ), β(τ)) uniquely solves
min(α,β) E[ρτ(Y− α− βX)]. (v) X ⊂ Z and |X | > 2.
(vi) Qτ(X) is identified i.e. E[(q(X) − Qτ(X)) ·
∫ 1
0 fY(u · (q(x)−Qτ(x))|X, Z)du] = 0 a.s
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implies that q(x) = Qτ(x) a.s.. (vii) 0 ∈ X
The essence of this assumption inherits from that of Assumption 12 and 13, that we used
for the case of continuous X. Compared to that assumption, the current assumption drops the
continuity of Qτ and the continuous distribution of X. Instead, it adds the restriction that X
is integer-valued although it can be relaxed to arbitrary discrete supports with isolated points.
Again I have to include the normalization assumption as I did in the continuous case. Under
this assumption, we obtain the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 8. If Assumption 15 is true, then there exist two distinct points x1, x2 ∈ X such that
(∆Lτ(x1)− ∆Qτ(x1)) · (∆Lτ(x2)− ∆Qτ(x2)) 6 0 holds.
A proof is found in Section C.4 in the appendix. It is proved analogously to the logic
used in the proof of Lemma 7, that we developed for the case of continuous X. This lemma
claims that there is some point x1 ∈ X at which β(τ) = ∆Lτ(x1) > ∆Qτ(x1) is true and
another point x2 ∈ X at which β(τ) = ∆Lτ(x2) 6 ∆Qτ(x2) is true. In other words, the slope
parameter β(τ) of the linear quantile regression is bounded from both above and below by
the differences ∆Qτ of the quantile function. This property immediately implies that β(τ) can
be written as a convex combination of {∆Qτ(x) | x ∈ X}, as formally stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 9. If Assumption 15 is true, then
β(τ) = E[w(X) · ∆Qτ(X)]
holds for a non-negative weight function w such that E[w(X)] = 1.
A proof is provided in Section C.5 in the appendix. While our proof constructs a particular
weight function w to establish the equality, such a weight function need not be unique.
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3.3 Conclusion
I have shown that the slope of the linear quantile regression gives a weighted mean square
approximation to the true quantile regression even in the presence of endogeneity. Extending
this result, I also show that the slope of the linear quantile regression represents a weighted
average of the local slope of the true quantile regression among a nontrivial subpopulation of
individuals even when the variable of interest is endogenous. These results follow from the
property that the linear and nonlinear functions related by weighted least squares must have
at least two intersection points. These findings coincides with the result given by Angrist,
Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val (2006) and Kato and Sasaki (2015) which analyzes the
misspecification problem of quantile regression under exogeneity. This paper shows that
similar interpretation holds even in the presence of endogeneity.
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Appendix A
Mathematical Appendix of Chapter
1
A.1 Proof or Proposition 1







βs · πt+s − dt+s · C f ] (A.1.1)
Let εt := θ − µt−1 + ηt. Note that Et[εt] = 0. Then we can write πt+1 as
πt+1 = φ · πt + µt + εt+1 (A.1.2)
Then we have
πt+s = φ








εt+k · φs−1−k (A.1.3)
Since Et[εt+k] = Et[Et+k[εt+k]] = 0 , we have











βs−1 · πt+s] =
φ
1− β · φ · πt +
1




βs−1 · Et+1[µt+k] (A.1.5)
Therefore the firm value can be written as
Mt+1 =
φ
1− β · φ · πt + V(µt, τt) (A.1.6)
where
V(µt, τt) = max
dt
{ 1
1− β · φ · µt − dt · C f + β · E[V(µt, τt)]} (A.1.7)
If dt = 1 (the firm fires the CEO), then the firm hires a new CEO and pays the firing cost
Vf (µt, τt) = V(µ0, 0)− C f (A.1.8)
If dt = 0 (the firm keeps the CEO), then
Vk(µt, τt) =
1
1− β · φ · µt + β · E[V(µt+1, τt+1)] (A.1.9)
The CEO retires after T years at the office and the firm hires a new CEO. Hence if τt = T
we have
Vk(µt, T) = V(µ0, 0) (A.1.10)
The firm chooses dt according to
V(µt, τt) = max{Vk(µt, τt), Vf (µt, τt)} (A.1.11)
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From equation(1.2.4), if dt = 0, µt and τt follows






τt + 1 if (0 ≤ τt ≤ T − 1)












Substitute equation (A.1.12)-(A.13) to equation (A.1.9) completes the proof.
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Appendix B
Mathematical Appendix of Chapter
2
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that M and L intersect at most at one point of x.
Define the short-hand notation
∆(x, α, β) := α + βx−M(x) = L(x)−M(x).
Under the current assumption, we have at most one zero for ∆( · , α, β) in X . By Assumption
3 (iv)-(v), it follows that either one of the following three cases is true.
(I) There exists a point x∗ ∈ X such that ∆(x, α, β) · ∆(x′, α, β) < 0 for all x ∈ X ∩ (x∗, ∞)
and for all x′ ∈ X ∩ (−∞, x∗).
(II) There exists a point x∗ ∈ X such that ∆(x∗, α, β) = 0, but ∆(x, α, β) · ∆(x′, α, β) > 0 for
all x, x′ ∈ X such that x 6= x∗ and x′ 6= x∗.
(III) ∆(x, α, β) · ∆(x′, α, β) > 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X .
We claim below that each of the cases (I)–(III) contradicts Assumption 3 (ii) that (α, β) uniquely
solves min(a,b) E[ω(X) · (M(X)− a− bX)2].
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First, consider case (I). Without loss of generality, we normalize the location to x∗ = 0 and
assume ∆(x, α, β) < 0 for all x > 0. For each ε > 0, define the set
A(ε) = {x ∈ R++ ∩ X | ∆(x, α, β + ε) 6 0} ∪ {x ∈ R−− ∩ X | ∆(x, α, β + ε) > 0} .
We let B1 and B2 denote arbitrary compact intervals contained in X ∩R−− and X ∩R++,





exists due to the compactness of B1 ∪ B2 and the
continuity of ∆(x,α,β)−x with respect to x on B






then ∆(x, α, β + ε) > 0 for all x ∈ B1 and ∆(x, α, β + ε) 6 0 for all x ∈ B2. Hence, for
any compact intervals B1 ⊂ X ∩ R−− and B2 ⊂ X ∩ R++, there exists ε > 0 such that
(B1 ∪ B2) ⊂ A(ε). Furthermore, note that ε > 0 is true. Now, observe from the definition of
A(ε) that the inequality











(εx)2 ·ω(x) dFX(x) (B.1.1)









for each integer n > 1. Then for
each n > 1, the above argument implies that there exists εn > 0 such that Bn ⊂ A(εn). But













x2 ·ω(x) dFX(x). (B.1.2)
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x2 ·ω(x) · fX(x) · 1{x ∈ X \ Bn} dx = 0 (B.1.3)





x2 ·ω(x) dFX(x) =
∫
X
x2 ·ω(x) · fX(x) dx =: c. (B.1.4)
Note that c > 0, and it holds with equality only if ω(x) · fX(x) = 0 almost everywhere on
X . But it is not true that ω(x) · fX(x) = 0 almost everywhere on X , from Assumption 3 (ii)




E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)]− E[(∆2(X, α, β + εn) ·ω(x)]
ε2n
> c > 0
is true. But then, there exists n∗ > 1 such that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)]− E[(∆2(X, α, β + εn∗ ) ·ω(x)]
ε2n∗
> 0.
This inequality implies that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)] > E[(∆2(X, α, β + εn∗) ·ω(x)],
and it contradicts Assumption 3 (ii), that (α, β) uniquely minimizes the weighted mean
squared distance.
Next, consider case (II). Without loss of generality, we normalize the location to x∗ = 0
and assume ∆(x, α, β) > 0 for all x 6= 0. For each ε > 0, define the set
A′(ε) = {x ∈ X |∆(x, α− ε, β) > 0} .
Let B1 and B2 denote arbitrary compact intervals contained in X ∩R−− and X ∩R++, re-
spectively. Note that minx∈B1∪B2 {∆(x, α, β)} exists due to the compactness of B1 ∪ B2 and the
continuity of ∆(x, α, β) with respect to x on B1 ∪ B2. If we choose ε := minx∈B1∪B2 {∆(x, α, β)},
then ∆(x, α− ε, β) > 0 for all x ∈ B1 ∪ B2. Hence, for any compact intervals B1 ⊂ X ∩R−−
and B2 ⊂ X ∩R++, there exists ε > 0 such that (B1 ∪ B2) ⊂ A′(ε). Furthermore, note that
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ε > 0 is true. It follows that the inequality











ε2 ·ω(x) dFX(x) (B.1.5)
holds for any ε > 0. By the same argument as the one used in case (I), for each integer n > 1,


























ω(x) · fX(x) dx =: c′ > 0. (B.1.8)
Thus, it follows from (B.1.5)–(B.1.8) that
lim
n→∞
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)]− E[(∆2(X, α− εn, β) ·ω(x)]
ε2n
> c′ > 0
is true. But then, there exists n∗∗ > 1 such that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)]− E[(∆2(X, α− εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(x)]
ε2n∗∗
> 0.
This inequality implies that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)] > E[(∆2(X, α− εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(x)],
and it contradicts Assumption 3 (ii), that (α, β) uniquely minimizes the weighted mean
squared distance.
Lastly, consider case (III). Without loss of generality, assume that ∆(x, α, β) > 0 for all
x ∈ X . As in case (II), if B1 and B2 are arbitrary compact intervals contained in X ∩R−− and
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X ∩R++, respectively, then there exists ε > 0 such that (B1 ∪ B2) ⊂ A′(ε). Thus,







ε2 ·ω(x) dFX(x) (B.1.9)
holds for any ε > 0 similarly to case (II). By the same argument as the one used in case (I), for


























ω(x) · fX(x) dx =: c′ > 0. (B.1.12)
Thus, it follows from (B.1.9)–(B.1.12) that
lim
n→∞
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)]− E[(∆2(X, α− εn, β) ·ω(x)]
ε2n
> c′ > 0
is true, similarly to case (II). But then, there exists n∗∗ > 1 such that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)]− E[(∆2(X, α− εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(x)]
ε2n∗∗
> 0.
This inequality implies that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(x)] > E[(∆2(X, α− εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(x)],
and it contradicts Assumption 3 (ii), that (α, β) uniquely minimizes the weighted mean
squared distance.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. From Lemma 1, Assumption 3 guarantees the existence of two points x1, x2 ∈ X such
that L(x1) = M(x1) and L(x2) = M(x2) are both true. Without loss of generality, let x1 < x2.
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By Assumption 4, we have M(x2)−M(x1) =
∫ x2
x1
M′(ξ) dξ by the Fundamental Theorem of
Calculus. Similarly, we have L(x2)− L(x1) =
∫ x2
x1
L′τ(ξ) dξ = β · (x2 − x1). Combining all
these equalities together yields
∫ x2
x1
M′(ξ) dξ = β · (x2 − x1).





















∣∣ x1 6 X 6 x2] .
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that β−∆M(x) < 0 is true for all x ∈ X . We consider
the following two cases.
(I) There exist x, x′ such that L(x)−M(x) < 0 and L(x′)−M(x′) > 0.
(II) L(x)−M(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X .
We derive a contradiction under each of these two cases to complete a proof. Specifically, we
show below that each of the cases (I) and (II) contradicts Assumption 8 (ii) that (α, β) uniquely
solves min(a,b) E[ω(X) · (M(X)− a− bX)2].
First, we consider case (I). Since β− ∆M(x) < 0 for all x ∈ X , if ∆(x, α, β) < 0 for some
x ∈ X , then ∆(x̃, α, β) < 0 for all x̃ > x. Also, if ∆(x′, α, β) > 0 for some x′ ∈ X , then
∆(x̃, α, β) > 0 for all x̃ < x′. Hence, there exists a unique x∗ ∈ X such that ∆(x, α, β) > 0
for all x 6 x∗ and ∆(x, α, β) < 0 for all x > x∗. Without loss of generality, we normalize the
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location to x∗ = 0. For each ε > 0, define the set
A(ε) = {x ∈ X ∩Z+ | ∆(x, α, β + ε) 6 0} ∪ {x ∈ X ∩Z− | ∆(x, α, β + ε) > 0} .
We let B denote an arbitrary nonempty finite subset of X .





, then ∆(x, α, β + ε) > 0 for all x ∈ B ∩ X+ and
∆(x, α, β + ε) 6 0 for all x ∈ B ∩ X−. Hence, for any finite subset B , there exists ε > 0 such
that B ⊂ A(ε). Furthermore, note that ε > 0 is true. Now, observe from the definition of A(ε)
that the inequality
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[(∆2(X, α, β + ε) ·ω(x)]
= ∑
x∈X
(−2∆(x, α, β)εx− (εx)2) ·ω(x) · p(x)
> ∑
x∈A(ε)
(εx)2 ·ω(x) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\A(ε)
(εx)2 ·ω(x) · p(x) (B.3.1)
holds for any ε > 0. Let Bn := {x ∈ X | − n 6 x 6 n} for each integer n > 1. Then for each,
n > 1, the preceding argument implies that there exists εn > 0 such that Bn ⊂ A(εn). But
then, for each n > 1, there exists εn > 0 such that
∑
x∈Bn
x2 ·ω(x) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\Bn
x2 ·ω(x) · p(x)
6 ∑
x∈A(εn)
x2 ·ω(x) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\A(εn)
x2 ·ω(x) · p(x). (B.3.2)




x2 ·ω(x) · p(x) = 0 (B.3.3)
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is true. Likewise, Assumption 8 (i),(iii) yield
lim
n→∞ ∑x∈Bn
x2 ·ω(x) · p(x) = ∑
x∈X
x2 ·ω(x) · p(x) =: c(τ). (B.3.4)
Note that c(τ) > 0, and it holds with equality only if ω(x) · p(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X But it is
not true that ω(x) · p(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X , from the property of (α, β) that it uniquely solves
min(a,b) E[ω(X)(M(X)− a− bX] . Thus, it follows from (B.3.1)–(B.3.4) that
lim
n→∞
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[(∆2(X, α, β + εn) ·ω(X)]
ε2n
> c(τ) > 0
is true. But then, there exists n∗ > 1 such that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[(∆2(X, α, β + εn∗ ) ·ω(X)]
ε2n∗
> 0.
This inequality implies that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)] > E[(∆2(X, α, β + εn∗) ·ω(X)],
and it contradicts Assumption 8 (ii), that (α, β) uniquely solves min(a,b) E[ω(X) · (M(X)−
a− bX)2].
Next, we consider case (II). Suppose there exists x∗∗ such that ∆(x∗∗, α, β) = 0. If x∗ =
maxX , we can derive a contradiction from an argument similar to case (I). If x∗ 6= maxX ,
then since β − ∆M(x) < 0 for all x ∈ X , ∆(x, α, β) < 0 for all x > x∗∗. This contradicts
∆(x, α, β) > 0 for all x ∈ X . Hence, ∆(x, α, β) > 0 for all x ∈ X . For each ε > 0, define the set
A′(ε) = {x ∈ X |∆(x, α− ε, β) > 0} .
Let B denote an arbitrary nonempty finite subset of X . If we choose ε := minx∈B {∆(x, α, β)},
then ∆(x, α− ε, β) > 0 for all x ∈ B. Hence, for any finite subset B ⊂ X , there exists ε > 0
such that B ⊂ A′(ε). Furthermore, note that ε > 0 is true. It follows that the inequality
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[∆2(X, α− ε, β) ·ω(X)]
= ∑
x∈X
(2∆(x, α, β)ε− ε2) ·ω(x) · p(x)
> ∑
x∈A′(ε)
ε2 ·ω(x) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\A′(ε)
ε2 ·ω(x) · p(x) (B.3.5)
holds for any ε > 0. Let Bn = {x ∈ X | − n 6 x 6 n} for each integer n > 1. Then, for each










ω(x) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\A′(εn)
ω(x) · p(x). (B.3.6)




ω(x) · p(x) = 0 and (B.3.7)
lim
n→∞ ∑x∈Bn
ω(x) · p(x) = ∑
x∈X
ω(x) · p(x) = c′(τ) > 0. (B.3.8)
Thus, it follows from (B.3.5)–(B.3.8) that
lim
n→∞
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[(∆2(X, α− εn, β) ·ω(X)]
ε2n
> c′(τ) > 0
is true. But then, there exists n∗∗ > 1 such that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[(∆2(X, α− εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(X)]
ε2n∗∗
> 0.
This inequality implies that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)] > E[(∆2(X, α− εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(X)],
and it contradicts Assumption 8 (ii), that (α, β) uniquely solves min(a,b) E[ω(X) · (M(X)−
a− bX)2].
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. First, consider the case where there exists x̃ ∈ X such that ∆L(x̃)− ∆M(x̃) = 0. In this
case,
β = ∆L(x̃) = ∆M(x̃) = E[w̃(X) · ∆M(X)] (B.4.1)
holds, where w̃(x) = 1/p(x) if x = x̃ and w̃(x) = 0 otherwise.
Next, consider the case where ∆L(x)− ∆M(x) 6= 0 for all x ∈ X . By Lemma 2, there exist
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holds, where λ(x1) =
β−∆M(x2)
∆M(x1)−∆M(x2)
· 1p(x1) , λ(x2) =
∆M(x1)−β
∆M(x1)−∆M(x2)
· 1p(x2) , and λ(x) =
0 for all x ∈ X \ {x1, x2}. Note that this weight function λ is non-negative because of
(∆L(x1)− ∆M(x1)) · (∆L(x2)− ∆M(x2)) 6 0.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Define the short-hand notation
∆(x, α, β) := α + x′β−M(x) = L(x)−M(x).
By way of contradiction, suppose M ≥ L for all x ∈ X . Then, either one of the following two
cases is true.
(I) There exists a point x∗ ∈ X such that ∆(x∗, α, β) = 0.
(II) ∆(x, α, β) < 0 for all x ∈ X .
We claim below that each of the cases (I)–(II) contradicts Assumption 9 that (α, β) uniquely
solves min(a,b) E[ω(X) · ∆2(X, α, β)].
First, consider case (I). We show that x∗ is unique. Suppose there exists x∗∗ 6= x∗ such
that ∆(x∗∗, α, β) = 0. Since M is strictly convex from Assumption 9 (vii), for any 0 < λ <
1, M(λx∗ + (1 − λ)x∗∗) < λ · M(x∗) + (1 − λ)M(x∗∗) = α + (λx∗ + (1 − λ)x∗∗)′β. This
contradicts M ≥ L for all x ∈ X . Hence, x∗ is unique. Without loss of generality, we
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normalize the location to x∗ = 0. For each ε > 0, define the set
A(ε) = {x ∈ X | − ε− ∆(x, α, β) > 0} .
Let B1 denote an arbitrary compact rectangle in X and B2 denote an open rectangle in
X such that B2 ⊂ B1 and 0 ∈ B2. Let B := B1 \ B2. Note that B is compact in X and
minx∈B {−∆(x, α, β)} exists due to the compactness of B and the continuity of ∆(x, α, β) with
respect to x on B.
If we choose ε := minx∈B {−∆(x, α, β)}, then −ε− ∆(x, α, β) > 0 for all x ∈ B. Hence, for
any B1, B2 which satisfies the aforementioned property, there exists ε > 0 such that B ⊂ A(ε).
Furthermore, note that ε > 0 is true. Now observe from the definition of A(ε) that the
inequality











ε2 ·ω(x) dFX(x) (B.5.1)
holds for any ε > 0. Let B1n := [−n, n]k, B2n := (− 1n ,
1
n )
k, and Bn = B1n \ B2n for each integer
n > 1. Then, for each integer n > 1, there exists εn > 0 such that Bn ⊂ A(εn). But then, for




























ω(x) · fX(x) dx =: c′ > 0. (B.5.4)
Thus, it follows from (B.5.1)–(B.5.4) that
lim
n→∞
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[∆2(X, α + εn, β) ·ω(X)]
ε2n
> c′ > 0
is true. But then, there exists n∗∗ > 1 such that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[∆2(X, α + εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(X)]
ε2n∗∗
> 0.
This inequality implies that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)] > E[∆2(X, α + εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(X)],
and it contradicts Assumption 9 (ii), that β uniquely minimizes the weighted mean squared
distance.
Next, we consider case (II). As in case (I), if B1 and B2 satisfy the property mentioned in
case (I), then there exists ε > 0 such that (B1 \ B2) ⊂ A(ε). Thus,







ε2 ·ω(x) dFX(x) (B.5.5)
holds for any ε > 0 similarly to case (I). By the same argument as the one used in case (I), for


























ω(x) · fX(x) dx =: c′. (B.5.8)
Note that c > 0, and it holds with equality only if ω(x, α, βτ) · fX(x) = 0 almost everywhere
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on X . But it is not true that ω(X) · fX(x) = 0 almost everywhere on X , from Assumption 9
(ii) that (α, β) uniquely minimizes the weighted mean squared distance.
Thus, it follows from (B.5.5)–(B.5.8) that
lim
n→∞
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[∆2(X, α + εn, β) ·ω(X)]
ε2n
> c′ > 0
is true, similarly to case (II). But then, there exists n∗∗ > 1 such that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)]− E[∆2(X, α + εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(X)]
ε2n∗∗
> 0.
This inequality implies that
E[∆2(X, α, β) ·ω(X)] > E[∆2(X, α + εn∗∗ , β) ·ω(X)],
and it contradicts Assumption 9 (ii), that β uniquely minimizes the weighted mean squared
distance.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. From Assumption 9 (vii), there exist x′1 > x∗1 and x
′′
















−1), then by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists x̃1 ∈
[x∗1 , x
′
1] such that M(x̃1, x
∗
−1) = L(x̃1, x
∗












. Recall that β̄ > β. From Assumption 9(vii), for all
x1 > x′1,
M(x1, x∗−1) > β̄1(x1 − x′1) + x∗−1β−1 + M(x′1, x∗−1). (B.6.1)
Note that β̄1(x1 − x′1) + x∗−1β−1 + M(x′1, x∗−1), as a function of x1, is the tangent line to the
curve M(·, x∗−1) at the point x1 = x′1. Since β̄1 > β1, β̄1(x1 − x′1) + x∗−1β−1 + M(x′1, x∗−1) and


















































such that M(x̄1, x∗−1) =
L(x̄1, x∗1).
Similarly we can show that there exists x1 < x∗1 such that M(x1, x
∗
−1) = L(x1, x
∗
1).
B.7 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. From Lemma 3, there exists x∗ ∈ X such that L(x∗) > M(x∗). Since M is continuous,
there exists ε > 0, such that for all x ∈ Bε(x∗), L(x) > M(x) where Bε denotes the open ε-ball










From Lemma 3 and 4, for each x−1 ∈ D−1, there exist x′1(x−1) ∈ R and x′′1 (x−1) ∈ R




1(x−1), x−1) = M(x
′
1(x−1), x−1) and L(x
′′
1 (x−1), x−1) =





dx1 = β · (x′′1 (x−1)− x′1(x−1)).
































∣∣∣∣X ∈ D] .
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B.8 Proof of Lemma 6




for each Γ ∈ B(U )⊗B(X ), where v(Γ, x) is defined by
v(Γ, x) = {u ∈ U | (u, x) ∈ Γ}.
Note that this set v(Γ, x) belongs to B(U ), as Γ belongs to the tensor product sigma algebra
B(U )⊗B(X ). We first show that this function Pτ is a probability measure. That Pτ(Γ) ∈ [0, 1]
for all Γ ∈ B(U )⊗B(X ) follows from the fact that µy,x is a probability measure (Lemma 5)
and FX is a probability measure. Likewise, by Lemma 5, we have
Pτ(∅) =
∫
µQτ(x),x(∅)dFX(x) = 0 and






Let {Γi}i ⊂ B(U )⊗B(X ) be a countable collection of disjoint sets. Note that, for each x ∈ X ,
v(Γi, x)∩v(Γj, x) = ∅ whenever i 6= j, and v(∪iΓi, x) = ∪iv(Γi, x). Therefore, from the fact
that µy,x is a probability measure (Lemma 5), we have the sigma additivity
Pτ(∪iΓi) =
∫







µτ(v(Γi, x), x)dFX(x) = ∑
i
Pτ(Γi)
where the last step uses the Fubini-Tonelli Theorem.
To show that µτ is a regular conditional probability measure given the events in B(X ), it
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holds for all (S, T) ∈ B(U )×B(X ). This follows straightforwardly, as
Pτ(S× T) =
∫
µτ(v(S× T, x), x)dFX(x)
=
∫






Mathematical Appendix of Chapter
3
C.1 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. We show that (α(τ), β(τ)) which solve the problem
min
β
(E[(1{Y < α(τ) + βX} − τ) · Z])2 (C.1.1)
is equivalent to the (α(τ), β(τ)) which solves the following problem.
min
β
E[ω̃τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ∆2τ(X, α(τ), β)] (C.1.2)
The first order condition of the equation (C.1.1) is
(E[(1{Y < α(τ) + βX} − τ) · Z]) = 0
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E[(1{Y < α(τ) + βX} − τ) · Z] = E[(1{ετ < ∆τ(X, α(τ), β)} − τ) · Z]








= E[ω̃τ(X, Z, α(τ), β(τ)) · ∆τ(X, α(τ), β) · X]
= 0
(C.1.3)
Which is equivalent to the first order condition of (C.1.2. Hence β(τ) is the solution to both
equation (C.1.2) and equation (C.1.1).
C.2 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Since Qτ(0) is known, α(τ) = Qτ(0). Hence Lτ and Qτ intersect at x=0. Suppose
Lτ and Qτ only intersect at the point x=0. Without loss of generality, assume Lτ > Qτ for
all x ∈ X \ {0}. Let ω̄(x, α(τ), β(τ)) =
∫
Z
ω̃(x, z, α(τ), β(τ))dFZ(z|x). Then the slope of the
linear quantile regression β(τ) solves
min
β
E[ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ∆2τ(X, α(τ), β)]
From Assumption 13 (ii) and (v), ω̄(x, α(τ), β(τ)) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X .
For each ε > 0, define the set
A(ε) = {x ∈ X \ {0} | ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ) + ε) 6 0}






exists due to the compactness of B and the continuity of ∆τ(x,α(τ),β(τ))−x with respect to x on





, then ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ) + ε) > 0 for all
x ∈ B. Hence, for any compact intervals B ⊂ X \ {0} there exists ε > 0 such that B ⊂ A(ε).
Furthermore, note that ε > 0 is true. Now, observe from the definition of A(ε) that the
inequality








(εx)2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) dFX(x)−
∫
X\A(ε)
(εx)2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) dFX(x)(C.2.1)
holds for any ε > 0. Let Bn := X ∩ [ 1n , n] for each integer n > 1. Then for each n > 1, the
above argument implies that there exists εn > 0 such that Bn ⊂ A(εn). But then, for each
n > 1, there exists εn > 0 such that
∫
Bn
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) dFX(x)−
∫
X\Bn




x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) dFX(x)−
∫
X\A(εn)
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) dFX(x). (C.2.2)
















x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · fX(x) · 1{x ∈ X \ Bn} dx = 0 (C.2.3)
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x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) dFX(x) =
∫
X
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · fX(x) dx =: c(τ). (C.2.4)
Note that c(τ) > 0 and, it holds with equality only if ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · fX(x) = 0 almost
everywhere onX . But it is not true that ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · fX(x) = 0 almost everywhere onX




E[∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))]− E[(∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ) + εn) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))]
ε2n
> c(τ) > 0
is true. But then, there exists n∗ > 1 such that




E[∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))] > E[(∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ) + εn∗) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))],
and it contradicts the aforementioned property of β(τ) that it solves (C.1.2).
C.3 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. From Lemma 7, Assumption 12 guarantees existence of two points 0, x1 ∈ X such that










τ(ξ) dξ = β(τ) · (x1 − 0). Combining all these equalities together yields
∫ x1
0
Q′τ(ξ) dξ = β(τ) · x1.























∣∣ 0 6 X 6 x1] .
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C.4 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that ∆Lτ(x) − ∆Qτ(x) < 0 is true for all x ∈ X .




E[ω̄τ(X, Z, α(τ), β(τ)) · ∆2τ(X, α(τ), β)], (C.4.1)
where ω̃τ(x, z, α(τ), β(τ)) and ∆τ(X, α, β) are defined by






fY(u(α(τ) + β(τ)x) + (1− u)QY|X(τ|x)|XZ)du,
∆τ(X, α, β) := α(τ) + β(τ)x−Qτ(x) = Lτ(x)−Qτ(x).
Let ω̄(x, α(τ), β(τ)) =
∫
Z




E[ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ∆2τ(X, α(τ), β)]
From Assumption 15 (ii) and (v), ω̄(x, α(τ), β(τ)) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X .
Since ∆Lτ(x) − ∆Qτ(x) < 0 for all x ∈ X , if ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) < 0 for some x ∈ X ,
then ∆τ(x̃, α(τ), β(τ)) < 0 for all x̃ > x. Also, if ∆τ(x′, α(τ), β(τ)) > 0 for some x′ ∈ X ,
then ∆τ(x̃, α(τ), β(τ)) > 0 for all x̃ < x′. From Assumption 15 (i) L(0)-Q(0)=0. Hence
∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) > 0 for all x 6 0 and ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) < 0 for all x > 0. For each ε > 0,
define the set
A(ε) = {x ∈ X ∩Z+ | ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ) + ε) 6 0}∪{x ∈ X ∩Z− | ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ) + ε) > 0} .
We let B denote an arbitrary nonempty finite subset of X .





, then ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ) + ε) > 0 for all x ∈
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B∩X+ and ∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ) + ε) 6 0 for all x ∈ B∩X−. Hence, for any finite subset B , there
exists ε > 0 such that B ⊂ A(ε). Furthermore, note that ε > 0 is true. Now, observe from the
definition of A(ε) that the inequality
E[∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))]− E[(∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ) + ε) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))]
= ∑
x∈X
(−2∆τ(x, α(τ), β(τ))εx− (εx)2) · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x)
> ∑
x∈A(ε)
(εx)2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\A(ε)
(εx)2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x) (C.4.2)
holds for any ε > 0. Let Bn := {x ∈ X | − n 6 x 6 n} for each integer n > 1. Then for each
n > 1, the above argument implies that there exists εn > 0 such that Bn ⊂ A(εn). But then,
for each n > 1, there exists εn > 0 such that
∑
x∈Bn
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\Bn
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x)
6 ∑
x∈A(εn)
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x)− ∑
x∈X\A(εn)
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x). (C.4.3)




x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x) = 0 (C.4.4)
is true. Likewise, Assumption 15 (i)–(ii) yield
lim
n→∞ ∑x∈Bn
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x) = ∑
x∈X
x2 · ω̄τ(x, α(τ), β(τ)) · p(x) =: c(τ). (C.4.5)
Note that c(τ) > 0 and, it holds with equality only if ω̄τ(x, α(τ), βτ) · p(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X
But it is not true that ω̄τ(x, α(τ), βτ) · p(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X from the property of (α(τ), β(τ))
that it uniquely solves (C.4.1) . Thus it follows from (C.4.2)–(C.4.5) that
lim
n→∞
E[∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))]− E[(∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ) + εn) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))]
ε2n
> c(τ) > 0
92
is true. But then, there exists n∗ > 1 such that




E[∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ)) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))] > E[(∆2τ(X, α(τ), β(τ) + εn∗) · ω̄τ(X, α(τ), β(τ))],
and it contradicts the aforementioned property of β(τ) that it solves (C.4.1).
C.5 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. First, consider the case where there exists x̃ ∈ X such that ∆Lτ(x̃)− ∆Qτ(x̃) = 0. In
this case,
β(τ) = ∆Lτ(x̃) = ∆Qτ(x̃) = E[w(X) · ∆Qτ(X)] (C.5.1)
holds, where w(x) = 1/p(x) if x = x̃ and w(x) = 0 otherwise.
Next, consider the case where ∆Lτ(x)− ∆Qτ(x) 6= 0 for all x ∈ X . By Lemma 2, there









holds, where λ(x1) =
β(τ)−∆Qτ(x2)
∆Qτ(x1)−∆Qτ(x2)
· 1p(x1) , λ(x2) =
∆Qτ(x1)−β(τ)
∆Qτ(x1)−∆Qτ(x2)
· 1p(x2) , and λ(x) =
0 for all x ∈ X \ {x1, x2}. Note that this weight function λ is non-negative because of
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